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Une évaluation empirique de la nouvelle tarification de l’assurance automobile (1992) au Québec

Author

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  • Dionne, Georges

    (Chaire de gestion des risques, École des Hautes Études Commerciales)

  • Vanasse, Charles

    (Centre de recherche sur les transports, Université de Montréal)

Abstract

The goal of this research was to evaluate the effects of the 1992 change in the automobile insurance pricing by the Société de l'assurance automobile du Québec (SAAQ, the public insurer for bodily injuries) on road safety. Our results indicate that the new pricing system reduced infractions and accidents which means that it increased road safety. Moreover, our results show that the total number of demerit points accumulated over two years is a good predictor for road accidents in the next two-year period which supports the pricing formula of the SAAQ. Finally, we obtain that this pricing policy introduces more fairness in actuarial terms by charging higher premia to higher risks. These results were obtained from the parameters estimation of the Negative Binomial distribution with random effects to take into account of the panel characteristics of the data. Le but de cette recherche était d’évaluer l’effet du changement de tarification de 1992 sur la sécurité routière au Québec. Nos résultats indiquent que le changement de tarification a réduit les nombres d’infractions et les nombres d’accidents, deux variables qui mesurent indirectement la non-prévention routière. De plus, nos résultats indiquent que le nombre de points d’inaptitude accumulés au cours d’une période de deux ans est un bon prédicteur du nombre d’accidents de la période suivante de deux ans ce qui supporte la politique de tarification de la SAAQ. En effet, cette politique en plus d’inciter plus de prudence, fait payer des contributions d’assurance proportionnelles aux risques individuels. En d’autres termes, le changement de 1992 a réintroduit une tarification des risques plus équitable au sens actuariel en faisant payer aux risques élevés des contributions d’assurance plus élevées. Ces résultats ont été obtenus de l’estimation des paramètres de la loi de distribution binomiale négative avec effets aléatoires pour tenir compte de l’aspect panel des données.

Suggested Citation

  • Dionne, Georges & Vanasse, Charles, 1997. "Une évaluation empirique de la nouvelle tarification de l’assurance automobile (1992) au Québec," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 73(1), pages 47-80, mars-juin.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:73:y:1997:i:1:p:47-80
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    Cited by:

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    2. Xavier d'Haultfoeuille & Philippe Février, 2007. "Identification and Estimation of Incentive Problems : Adverse Selection," Working Papers 2007-21, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    3. Magali Chaudey, 2017. "Why test the theory of incentives in a dynamic framework?," Working Papers 1733, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • R40 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - General
    • R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise

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