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Collusion et information asymétrique

  • Laffont, Jean Jacques

    (IDEI-GREMAQ, Université de Toulouse I)

After justifying the empirical and the theoretical relevance of the analysis of collusion in organizations and markets, the paper presents the two methods available today for studying collusion under incomplete information. Then, a brief survey of the literature is provided and it is shown how taking into account collusion prevents the implementation of the first best in principal-agent theory when agents' characteristics are correlated. Après avoir justifié l’intérêt empirique et l’intérêt théorique des recherches sur la collusion dans les organisations et les marchés, l’article présente les deux méthodes disponibles aujourd’hui pour l’analyse théorique de la collusion en information incomplète. Ensuite, un bref tour d’horizon de la littérature est proposé et on montre comment la prise en compte de la collusion est un obstacle à la réalisation de l’optimum de premier rang dans la théorie principal-agents lorsque les caractéristiques des agents sont corrélées.

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Article provided by Société Canadienne de Science Economique in its journal L'Actualité économique.

Volume (Year): 73 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 (décembre)
Pages: 595-609

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Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:73:y:1997:i:4:p:595-609
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  1. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January.
  2. Kihlstrom, Richard & Vives, Xavier, 1992. "Collusion by Asymmetrically Informed Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(2), pages 371-96, Summer.
  3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2000. "Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 309-342, March.
  4. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Incentives and incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers RP -354, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1999. " Collusion-Proof Samuelson Conditions for Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(4), pages 399-438.
  6. Peter Cramton & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1991. "Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs," Papers of Peter Cramton 90ier, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
  7. Grossman, Sanford J. & Perry, Motty, 1986. "Perfect sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 97-119, June.
  8. Cramton Peter C. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 255-283, August.
  9. Laffont, J.J. & Martimort, D., 1995. "Collusion and Delegation," Papers 95.397, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  10. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-57, November.
  11. Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1992. "Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 378-399, April.
  12. Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1992. "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions," NBER Working Papers 4013, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Maskin, Eric, 1980. "A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(6), pages 1507-20, September.
  14. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990. "Bidding Rings," Working Papers 726, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  15. Laffont, J.J. & Martimort, D., 1996. "Collusion Under Asymmetric Information," Papers 95.389, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  16. Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J., 1990. "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency," Working Papers 91-01, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  17. Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C, 1987. "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1217-39, December.
  18. Mailath, George J. & Zemsky, Peter, 1991. "Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 467-486, November.
  19. Kihlstrom, Richard E. & Vives, Xavier, 1989. "Collusion by asymmetrically informed duopolists," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 5(2-3), pages 371-402.
  20. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1979. "On Coalition Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 243-54, April.
  21. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1999. "Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 232-262, Summer.
  22. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September.
  23. Ma, Ching-to & Moore, John & Turnbull, Stephen, 1988. "Stopping agents from "cheating"," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 355-372, December.
  24. Roberts, Kevin, 1985. "Cartel Behaviour and Adverse Selection," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(4), pages 401-13, June.
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