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Essays in antitrust economics

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  • Verouden, V.C.H.M.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

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  • Verouden, V.C.H.M., 2001. "Essays in antitrust economics," Other publications TiSEM 6e4ad3c9-8c24-479c-aea2-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:6e4ad3c9-8c24-479c-aea2-6c9633351210
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cramton Peter C. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 255-283, August.
    2. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 427-438, March.
    3. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    4. Kihlstrom, Richard E. & Vives, Xavier, 1989. "Collusion by asymmetrically informed duopolists," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 5(2-3), pages 371-402.
    5. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1997. "Collusion under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 875-912, July.
    6. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2000. "Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 309-342, March.
    7. Francis Bloch, 1995. "Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 537-556, Autumn.
    8. Cramton, Peter C & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1990. "Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(1), pages 17-47, February.
    9. Kihlstrom, Richard & Vives, Xavier, 1992. "Collusion by Asymmetrically Informed Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(2), pages 371-396, Summer.
    10. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "On the revelation of preferences for public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 79-93, August.
    11. Roberts, Kevin, 1985. "Cartel Behaviour and Adverse Selection," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(4), pages 401-413, June.
    12. Phlips,Louis, 1995. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521498715, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wagner, W.B., 2002. "Risk sharing under incentive constraints," Other publications TiSEM 1bd8e44d-62a5-4cf7-96b2-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Onderstal, A.M., 2002. "Papers in auction theory," Other publications TiSEM 7d84e23f-2bb6-4e3c-a689-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Stremersch, S., 2001. "Essays on marketing strategy in technology-intensive markets," Other publications TiSEM 51d17923-2aae-485b-a59b-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Marcel Canoy & S. Onderstal, 2003. "Tight oligopolies: in search of proportionate remedies," CPB Document 29, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    5. Marcel Canoy & S. Onderstal, 2003. "Tight oligopolies: in search of proportionate remedies," CPB Document 29.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    6. Roosenboom, P.G.J., 2002. "Corporate governance mechanisms in IPO firms," Other publications TiSEM 70d9c457-8e98-4dde-89be-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Konovalov, A., 2001. "Essays in general equilibrium theory," Other publications TiSEM fece7269-5d1e-47b9-a21c-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. Timmer, J.B., 2001. "Cooperative behaviour, uncertainty and operations research," Other publications TiSEM 4a00d965-b7c4-4f43-8f76-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Bellemare, C., 2004. "Microeconometric essays on migration, trust and Satisfaction," Other publications TiSEM e1e9cd8e-64ac-45df-9611-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    10. Conlon, B.J., 2001. "Consumer rationality in choice," Other publications TiSEM 871f3881-187f-4197-8162-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    11. Chvyrkov, O., 2004. "Top management teams of internationalizing firms : Demography, social processes and learning at the top," Other publications TiSEM 25b41423-7a7a-4b46-b14d-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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