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Deuda soberana: indexación y vencimiento

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  • Laura Alfaro
  • Fabio Kanczuk

Abstract

(Documento disponible en idioma inglés) En este trabajo se repasa la obra publicada sobre la deuda soberana, con interés especial en la indexación y el vencimiento, y las principales propuestas de políticas relacionadas con estos temas. También se proponen algunas implicaciones derivadas de este trabajo. En Alfaro y Kanczuk (2005a, b, c), se define la deuda soberana como un reclamo contingente según el marco de referencia desarrollado por Grossman y Van Huyck (1988). Sin embargo, en el marco de referencia empleado se reconoce que la deuda contingente puede guardar relación con problemas de incentivos. Al aplicar este marco de referencia al estudio de la sustentabilidad de la deuda soberana, la compensación entre deuda nominal y deuda indexada y el vencimiento óptimo de la deuda, se halló que algunas de las propuestas presentadas en la obra publicada en cuanto al alargamiento de los vencimientos de deuda y la emisión de deuda nominal son insostenibles en economías emergentes (inestables).

Suggested Citation

  • Laura Alfaro & Fabio Kanczuk, 2006. "Deuda soberana: indexación y vencimiento," Research Department Publications 4460, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4460
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