One Reason Countries Pay Their Debts: Renegotiation and International Trade
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- Rose, Andrew K., 2005. "One reason countries pay their debts: renegotiation and international trade," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 189-206, June.
- Andrew K. Rose, 2001. "One reason countries pay their debts: renegotiation and international trade," Staff Reports 142, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Andrew K. Rose, 2002. "One Reason Countries Pay Their Debts: Renegotiation and International Trade," Working Papers 042002, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
- Andrew K. Rose, 2002. "One Reason Countries Pay their Debts: Renegotiation and International Trade," NBER Working Papers 8853, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Andrew K. Rose, 2002. "One Reason Countries Pay their Debts: Renegotiation and International Trade," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 18, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
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More about this item
Keywords
Empirical; Sovereign; Default; Bilateral; Panel; Gravity; Paris; Club; Rescheduling;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
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