Trade sanctions are often criticized as ineffective because they create incentives for evasion or as harmful to the target country's population. Loan sanctions, in contrast, could be self-enforcing and could protect the population from being saddled with "odious debt" run up by looting or repressive dictators. Governments could impose loan sanctions by instituting legal changes that prevent seizure of countries' assets for nonrepayment of debt incurred after sanctions were imposed. This would reduce creditors' incentives to lend to sanctioned regimes. Restricting sanctions to cover only loans made after the sanction was imposed would help avoid time-consistency problems.
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Volume (Year): 96 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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- Seema Jayachandran, 2004. "Odious Debt," UCLA Economics Online Papers 298, UCLA Department of Economics.
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- Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1998. "Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget," Levine's Working Paper Archive 209, David K. Levine.
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- Geoffrey Brennan & Giuseppe Eusepi, 2002. "The Dubious Ethics of Debt Default," Public Finance Review, , vol. 30(6), pages 546-561, November. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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