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Do countries “graduate” from crises? Some historical perspective

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  • Reinhart, Carmen
  • Qian, Rong
  • Rogoff, Kenneth

Abstract

The widespread banking crises since 2007 among advanced economies and the “near” default of Greece in 2010 dashed the popular notion that rich countries have outgrown severe financial crises. Record or near-record declines in output accompanying these events signaled the end of the short-lived “great moderation era.” In fact, graduation from recurring sovereign external debt crises is a very tortuous process that sometimes takes a century or more. For banking crises, we simply do not know what it takes to graduate; it is unclear whether any country has managed it.

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  • Reinhart, Carmen & Qian, Rong & Rogoff, Kenneth, 2010. "Do countries “graduate” from crises? Some historical perspective," MPRA Paper 24761, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:24761
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    1. Another case for plan B
      by chris dillow in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2011-07-27 18:31:10

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    Cited by:

    1. Rong Qian & Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2011. "On Graduation from Default, Inflation and Banking Crises: Elusive or Illusion?," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2010, Volume 25, pages 1-36 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Raffaela Giordano & Marcello Pericoli & Pietro Tommasino, 2013. "Pure or Wake-up-Call Contagion? Another Look at the EMU Sovereign Debt Crisis," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 131-160, June.
    3. Christoph A. Schaltegger & Martin Weder, 2015. "Fiscal Adjustments and the Probability of Sovereign Default," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(1), pages 81-110, February.
    4. Reinhart, Carmen M. & Reinhart, Vincent & Rogoff, Kenneth, 2015. "Dealing with debt," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(S1), pages 43-55.
      • Carmen M. Reinhart & Vincent Reinhart & Kenneth Rogoff, 2014. "Dealing with Debt," NBER Chapters,in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2014, pages 43-55 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Frankel, Jeffrey A. & Vegh, Carlos A. & Vuletin, Guillermo, 2013. "On graduation from fiscal procyclicality," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 32-47.
    6. Francesco Pappada & Yanos Zylberberg, 2018. "Hanging off a cliff: fiscal consolidations and default risk," 2018 Meeting Papers 844, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Maurice Obstfeld & Alan M. Taylor, 2017. "International Monetary Relations: Taking Finance Seriously," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 3-28, Summer.
    8. Amalia Morales-Zumaquero & Simón Sosvilla-Rivero, 2012. "Real exchange rate volatility, financial crises and nominal exchange regimes," Working Papers 12-05, Asociación Española de Economía y Finanzas Internacionales.
    9. Alina Carare & Ashoka Mody, 2012. "Spillovers of Domestic Shocks: Will They Counteract the ‘Great Moderation’?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 69-97, April.
    10. Vincent BouvatierBy, 2017. "The frequency of banking crises in a dynamic setting: a discrete-time duration approach," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(4), pages 1078-1100.
    11. Richard J. Herring, 2013. "The Case for Rapid Resolution Plans," Review of Economics & Finance, Better Advances Press, Canada, vol. 3, pages 1-17, May.
    12. Taylor, Alan M, 2010. "Global finance after the crisis," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 50(4), pages 366-377.
    13. Fendel Ralf & Stremmel Hanno, 2016. "Characteristics of Banking Crises: A Comparative Study with Geographical Contagion," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 236(3), pages 349-388, May.
    14. Pope, Robin & Selten, Reinhard, 2013. "Currency wars not public debt may create a financial meltdown," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79862, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    15. Faia, Ester, 2017. "Sovereign risk, bank funding and investors’ pessimism," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 79-96.
    16. Mark Aguiar, 2011. "Comment on "On Graduation from Default, Inflation and Banking Crises: Elusive or Illusion?"," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2010, Volume 25, pages 37-46 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Stephanie Lo & Kenneth Rogoff, 2015. "Secular stagnation, debt overhang and other rationales for sluggish growth, six years on," BIS Working Papers 482, Bank for International Settlements.
    18. Konstantin Egorov & Michal Fabinger, 2016. "Reputational Effects in Sovereign Default," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-999, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    19. Daniel Fried, 2017. "Inflation, Default, and the Currency Composition of Sovereign Debt in Emerging Economies: Working Paper 2017-01," Working Papers 52385, Congressional Budget Office.
    20. Qian, Rong, 2012. "Why do some countries default more often than others ? the role of institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5993, The World Bank.
    21. Giesecke, Kay & Longstaff, Francis A. & Schaefer, Stephen & Strebulaev, Ilya A., 2014. "Macroeconomic effects of corporate default crisis: A long-term perspective," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 297-310.
    22. Tjeerd M. Boonman & Jan P. A. M. Jacobs & Gerard H. Kuper, 2011. "Why didn't the Global Financial Crisis hit Latin America?," CIRANO Working Papers 2011s-63, CIRANO.
    23. Darracq Paries, Matthieu & Faia, Ester & Rodriguez-Palenzuela, Diego, 2013. "Bank and sovereign debt risk," SAFE Working Paper Series 7, Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt.
    24. Kay Giesecke & Francis A. Longstaff & Stephen Schaefer & Ilya Strebulaev, 2012. "Macroeconomic Effects of Corporate Default Crises: A Long-Term Perspective," NBER Working Papers 17854, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    25. Carvallo, Oscar & Kasman, Adnan & Kontbay-Busun, Sine, 2015. "The Latin American bank capital buffers and business cycle: Are they pro-cyclical?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 148-160.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    financial crisis; debt; default; banking; reversals; duration;

    JEL classification:

    • E0 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General
    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • N0 - Economic History - - General

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