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On Graduation from Default, Inflation and Banking Crises: Elusive or Illusion?

In: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2010, Volume 25

  • Rong Qian
  • Carmen M. Reinhart
  • Kenneth S. Rogoff

The widespread banking crises since 2007 among advanced economies and the “near” default of Greece in 2010 dashed the popular notion that rich countries have outgrown severe financial crises. Record or near-record declines in output accompanying these events signaled the end of the short-lived “great moderation era.” In fact, graduation from recurring sovereign external debt crises is a very tortuous process that sometimes takes a century or more. For banking crises, we simply do not know what it takes to graduate; it is unclear whether any country has managed it.

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This chapter was published in:
  • Daron Acemoglu & Michael Woodford, 2011. "NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2010, Volume 25," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number acem10-1.
  • This item is provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Chapters with number 12024.
    Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:12024
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