Why Larger Lenders obtain Higher Returns: Evidence from Sovereign Syndicated Loans
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Note: ISSN 1914-2838
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Issam Hallak & Paul Schure, 2011. "Why Larger Lenders Obtain Higher Returns: Evidence from Sovereign Syndicated Loans," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 40(2), pages 427-453, June.
References listed on IDEAS
- Eaton, Jonathan & Fernandez, Raquel, 1995.
"Sovereign debt,"
Handbook of International Economics,in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 3, pages 2031-2077
Elsevier.
- Jonathan Eaton & Raquel Fernandez, 1995. "Sovereign Debt," NBER Working Papers 5131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Eaton, J. & Fernandez, R., 1995. "Sovereign Debt," Papers 37, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Jonathan Eaton & Raquel Fernandez, 1995. "Sovereign Debt," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 59, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
- Antje Brunner & Jan Pieter Krahnen, 2008.
"Multiple Lenders and Corporate Distress: Evidence on Debt Restructuring,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 75(2), pages 415-442.
- Brunner, Antje & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2004. "Multiple Lenders and Corporate Distress: Evidence on Debt Restructuring," CEPR Discussion Papers 4287, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Brunner, Antje & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2006. "Multiple lenders and corporate distress: Evidence on debt restructuring," CFS Working Paper Series 2001/04, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
- Cole, Harold L & Dow, James & English, William B, 1995.
"Default, Settlement, and Signalling: Lending Resumption in a Reputational Model of Sovereign Debt,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 365-385, May.
- Harold L. Cole & James Dow & William B. English, 1994. "Default, settlement, and signalling: lending resumption in a reputational model of sovereign debt," Staff Report 180, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Ongena, Steven & Smith, David C., 2000. "What Determines the Number of Bank Relationships? Cross-Country Evidence," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 26-56, January.
- Elsas, Ralf & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 1998.
"Is relationship lending special? Evidence from credit-file data in Germany,"
Journal of Banking & Finance,
Elsevier, vol. 22(10-11), pages 1283-1316, October.
- Elsas, Ralf & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 1998. "Is relationship lending special? Evidence from credit-file data in Germany," CFS Working Paper Series 1998/05, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
- Carletti, Elena, 2004.
"The structure of bank relationships, endogenous monitoring, and loan rates,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 58-86, January.
- Carletti, Elena, 2003. "The Structure of Bank Relationships, Endogenous Monitoring and Loan Rates," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 03-12, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Galina Hale, 2007.
"Bonds or Loans? the Effect of Macroeconomic Fundamentals,"
Economic Journal,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(516), pages 196-215, January.
- Galina Hale, 2003. "Bonds or Loans? The Effect of Macroeconomic Fundamentals," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1403, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Sep 2005.
- Galina Hale, 2003. "Bonds or Loans? The Effect of Macroeconomic Fundamentals," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm343, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Apr 2007.
- Grossman, Herschel I. & Han, Taejoon, 1999.
"Sovereign debt and consumption smoothing,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 149-158, August.
- Herschel I. Grossman & Taejoon Han, 1997. "Sovereign Debt and Consumption Smoothing," NBER Working Papers 5997, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Herschel I. Grossman & T. Han, 1997. "Sovereign Debt and Consumption Smoothing," Working Papers 97-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Bharath, Sreedhar & Dahiya, Sandeep & Saunders, Anthony & Srinivasan, Anand, 2007. "So what do I get? The bank's view of lending relationships," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 368-419, August.
- Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989.
"Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 43-50, March.
- Bulow, J. & Rogoff, K., 1988. "Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?," Papers 411, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Jeremy I. Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1988. "Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?," NBER Working Papers 2623, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bulow, J. & Rogoff, K., 1988. "Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?," Working papers 8813, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1998. "Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget," Levine's Working Paper Archive 209, David K. Levine.
- Gupta, Anurag & Singh, Ajai K. & Zebedee, Allan A., 2008. "Liquidity in the pricing of syndicated loans," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 339-376, November.
- Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 2004.
"Coordination risk and the price of debt,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 133-153, February.
- Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 1999. "Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1241R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Feb 2002.
- Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 2001. "Coordination risk and the price of debt," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25046, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 1999. "Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1241, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Hyun Song Shin & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt," FMG Discussion Papers dp373, Financial Markets Group.
- Amir Sufi, 2007. "Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(2), pages 629-668, April.
- Anthony Coleman & Neil Esho & Ian Sharpe, 2006. "Does Bank Monitoring Influence Loan Contract Terms?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 30(2), pages 177-198, October.
- Elsas, Ralf, 2005. "Empirical determinants of relationship lending," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 32-57, January.
- Rose, Andrew K., 2005.
"One reason countries pay their debts: renegotiation and international trade,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 189-206, June.
- Andrew K. Rose, 2001. "One reason countries pay their debts: renegotiation and international trade," Staff Reports 142, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Andrew K. Rose, 2002. "One Reason Countries Pay their Debts: Renegotiation and International Trade," NBER Working Papers 8853, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rose, Andrew K, 2002. "One Reason Countries Pay Their Debts: Renegotiation and International Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers 3157, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Andrew K. Rose, 2002. "One Reason Countries Pay Their Debts: Renegotiation and International Trade," Working Papers 042002, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
- Andrew K. Rose, 2002. "One Reason Countries Pay their Debts: Renegotiation and International Trade," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 18, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
- Ciarlone, Alessio & Piselli, Paolo & Trebeschi, Giorgio, 2009.
"Emerging markets' spreads and global financial conditions,"
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money,
Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 222-239, April.
- Alessio Ciarlone & Paolo Piselli & Giorgio Trebeschi, 2007. "Emerging Markets Spreads and Global Financial Conditions," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 637, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
- Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas, 2000. "Equity, Bonds, and Bank Debt: Capital Structure and Financial Market Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 324-351, April.
- Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 2000.
"Lending booms, reserves and the sustainability of short-term debt: inferences from the pricing of syndicated bank loans,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 5-44, October.
- Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, 1999. "Lending Booms, Reserves, and the Sustainability of Short-Term Debt: Inferences from the Pricing of Syndicated Bank Loans," NBER Working Papers 7113, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 1999. "Lending booms, reserves, and the sustainability of short-term debt - inferences from the pricing of syndicated bank loans," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2155, The World Bank.
- Preece, Dianna & Mullineaux, Donald J., 1996. "Monitoring, loan renegotiability, and firm value: The role of lending syndicates," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 577-593, April.
- Dennis, Steven A. & Mullineaux, Donald J., 2000. "Syndicated Loans," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 404-426, October.
- Sharpe, Steven A, 1990.
" Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1069-1087, September.
- Steven A. Sharpe, 1989. "Asymmetric information, bank lending, and implicit contracts: a stylized model of customer relationships," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 70, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Block, Steven A. & Vaaler, Paul M., 2004.
"The price of democracy: sovereign risk ratings, bond spreads and political business cycles in developing countries,"
Journal of International Money and Finance,
Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 917-946, October.
- Steven A. Block & Paul M. Vaaler, 2001. "The Price of Democracy: Sovereign Risk Ratings, Bond Spreads and Political Business Cycles in Developing Countries," CID Working Papers 82, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
- Diamond, Douglas W & Verrecchia, Robert E, 1991. " Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1325-1359, September.
- Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1996. "Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 1-25, February.
- Hallak, Issam, 2009. "Renegotiation and the pricing structure of sovereign bank loans: Empirical evidence," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 89-103, January.
- Lee, Suk Hun, 1991. "Ability and willingness to service debt as explanation for commercial and official rescheduling cases," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 5-27, February.
- Boot, Arnoud W. A., 2000. "Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 7-25, January.
- Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. " The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(1), pages 3-37, March.
- Pegaret Pichler, 2001. "A Theory of the Syndicate: Form Follows Function," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(6), pages 2237-2264, December.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Hallak, Issam, 2013. "Private sector share of external debt and financial stability: Evidence from bank loans," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 17-41.
More about this item
Keywords
Financial Intermediation; Syndicated loans; Sovereign debt; Relationship Lending; Debt Renegotiation; Illiquidity; Number of Lenders;JEL classification:
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-2009-01-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2009-01-10 (Banking)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vic:vicddp:0802. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Graham Voss). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/devicca.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.