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Sovereigns in Distress: Do They Need Bankruptcy?


  • Michelle White

    (University of Michigan)


No abstract is available for this item.

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  • Michelle White, 2002. "Sovereigns in Distress: Do They Need Bankruptcy?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 33(1), pages 287-320.
  • Handle: RePEc:bin:bpeajo:v:33:y:2002:i:2002-1:p:287-320

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Eichengreen, Barry & Ruhl, Christof, 2001. "The bail-in problem: systematic goals, ad hoc means," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 3-32, March.
    2. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(1), pages 1-41.
    3. Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 1999. "Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2343, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Bebchuk, Lucian Ayre & Chang, Howard F, 1992. "Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 253-279, April.
    5. Webb, David C, 1991. "An Economic Evaluation of Insolvency Procedures in the United Kingdom: Does the 1986 Insolvency Act Satisfy the Creditors' Bargain?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 43(1), pages 139-157, January.
    6. Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 2000. "Would collective action clauses raise borrowing costs? - an update and additional results," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2363, The World Bank.
    7. White, Michelle J, 1989. "The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 129-151, Spring.
    8. Kenneth Rogoff, 1999. "International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 21-42, Fall.
    9. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
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    Cited by:

    1. Issam Hallak, 2004. "Why Borrowers Pay Premiums to Larger Lenders: Empirical Evidence from Sovereign Syndicated Loans," CSEF Working Papers 124, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    2. Thomas, Jonathan P., 2004. "Bankruptcy proceedings for sovereign state insolvency and their effect on capital flows," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 341-361.
    3. Hallak, Issam, 2002. "Why borrowers pay premiums to larger lenders: Empirical evidence from sovereign syndicated loans," CFS Working Paper Series 2002/02, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    4. Gary Dymski, 2011. "The International Debt Crisis," Chapters,in: The Handbook of Globalisation, Second Edition, chapter 6 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Will the Sovereign Debt Market Survive?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 85-90, May.
    6. Haldane, Andrew G. & Penalver, Adrian & Saporta, Victoria & Shin, Hyun Song, 2005. "Analytics of sovereign debt restructuring," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 315-333, March.
    7. Michelle J. White, 2005. "Economic Analysis of Corporate and Personal Bankruptcy Law," NBER Working Papers 11536, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Jérôme Sgard, 2011. "The IMF Meets Commercial Banks: Sovereign Debt Restructuring between 1970 and 1989," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompq, Sciences Po.
    9. Marcus H. Miller, 2002. "Sovereign Debt Restructuring: New Articles, New Contracts--Or No Change?," Policy Briefs PB02-03, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    10. Jonathan P. Thomas, 2004. "Bankruptcy Proceedings for Sovereign State Insolvency," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 265-279, February.
    11. Häseler, Sönke, 2008. "Individual Enforcement Rights in International Sovereign Bonds," MPRA Paper 11518, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Paolo RICCI & Renato CIVITILLO, 2015. "Local government financial distress: international comparison and latest developments in the light of the Italian spending review approach," REVISTA DE MANAGEMENT COMPARAT INTERNATIONAL/REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE MANAGEMENT, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 16(2), pages 239-255, May.
    13. Barry Eichengreen, 2003. "Restructuring Sovereign Debt," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 75-98, Fall.
    14. Urs W. Birchler & Dominik Egli, 2003. "Ein neues Bankinsolvenzrecht für die Schweiz," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 139(II), pages 125-154, June.
    15. Hallak, Issam, 2003. "Courts and sovereign eurobonds: Credibility of the judicial enforcement of repayment," CFS Working Paper Series 2003/34, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).


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