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Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization

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  • Lucian Arye Bebchuk
  • Howard F. Chang

Abstract

This paper develops a sequential bargaining model of the negotiations in corporate reorganizations under Chapter 11. We identify the expected outcome of the bargaining process and examine the effects of the legal rules that shape the bargaining. We determine how much value equity holders and debt holders receive under the Chapter 11 process, and compare the value obtained by each class with the 'contractual right' of that class. We identify and analyze three reasons that the equity holders can expect to obtain some value even when the debt holders are not paid in full. Finally, we show how the features of the reorganization process and of the company filing under Chapter 11 affect the division of value, and in this way we provide several testable predictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, 1991. "Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization," NBER Technical Working Papers 0097, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberte:0097
    Note: ME
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    References listed on IDEAS

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