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Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization

  • Lucian Arye Bebchuk
  • Howard F. Chang

This paper develops a sequential bargaining model of the negotiations in corporate reorganizations under Chapter 11. We identify the expected outcome of the bargaining process and examine the effects of the legal rules that shape the bargaining. We determine how much value equity holders and debt holders receive under the Chapter 11 process, and compare the value obtained by each class with the 'contractual right' of that class. We identify and analyze three reasons that the equity holders can expect to obtain some value even when the debt holders are not paid in full. Finally, we show how the features of the reorganization process and of the company filing under Chapter 11 affect the division of value, and in this way we provide several testable predictions.

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File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/t0097.pdf
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Technical Working Papers with number 0097.

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Date of creation: Feb 1991
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol. 8, no. 2, pp 253-179 (1992)
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberte:0097
Note: ME
Contact details of provider: Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Web page: http://www.nber.org
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  1. Summers, Lawrence H. & Cutler, David, 1988. "The Costs of Conflict Resolution and Financial Distress: Evidence from the Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation," Scholarly Articles 2689179, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  2. Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November.
  3. repec:cep:stitep:/1990/217 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. White, Michelle J, 1989. "The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 129-51, Spring.
  5. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
  6. Charles P. Normandin, 1989. "The changing nature of debt and equity; a legal perspective," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 33, pages 49-79.
  7. Grossman, Sanford J. & Perry, Motty, 1986. "Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 120-154, June.
  8. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Default And Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model Of Debt," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 1-41, February.
  9. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1990. "A Theory of Corporate Financial Structure Based on the Seniority of Claims," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 217, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  10. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1990. "A Theory of Corporate Financial Structure Based on the Seniority of Claims," NBER Working Papers 3431, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Gul, Faruk & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1988. "On Delay in Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 601-11, May.
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