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La gestion des crises de liquidité internationale : logique de faillite, prêteur en dernier ressort et conditionnalité

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  • Jérôme Sgard
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    Paper provided by CEPII research center in its series Working Papers with number 2000-16.

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    Date of creation: Nov 2000
    Handle: RePEc:cii:cepidt:2000-16
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    1. Alston, Lee J, 1984. "Farm Foreclosure Moratorium Legislation: A Lesson from the Past," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 445-457, June.
    2. Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 2000. "Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? An Update and Additional Results," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series qt46p4z4c4, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    3. Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, 2000. "Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?," NBER Working Papers 7458, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Yijiang Wang & Chong-En Bai, 1999. "The Myth of the East Asian Miracle: The Macroeconomic Implications of Soft Budgets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 432-437, May.
    5. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-419, June.
    6. Timothy D. Lane & A. Javier Hamann & Marianne Schulze-Gattas & Ales Bulir & Steven T Phillips & Atish R. Ghosh & Alex Mourmouras & Jack Boorman, 2000. "Managing Financial Crises; The Experience in East Asia," IMF Working Papers 00/107, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Thomas Laursen & Juan Jose Fernandez-Ansola, 1995. "Historical Experience with Bond Financing to Developing Countries," IMF Working Papers 95/27, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Eichengreen, Barry & Ruhl, Christof, 2001. "The bail-in problem: systematic goals, ad hoc means," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 3-32, March.
    9. Charles W. Calomiris, 1998. "The IMF's Imprudent Role As Lender of Last Resort," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 17(3), pages 275-294, Winter.
    10. James M. Boughton, 1997. "From Suez to Tequila; The IMF As Crisis Manager," IMF Working Papers 97/90, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Balleisen, Edward J., 1996. "Vulture Capitalism in Antebellum America: The 1841 Federal Bankruptcy Act and the Exploitation of Financial Distress," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 70(04), pages 473-516, December.
    12. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Microeconomics of Banking," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061937.
    13. Philippe Aghion & Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1992. "The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform," NBER Working Papers 4097, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. William R. Cline, 1995. "International Debt Reexamined," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 46, January.
    15. Kenen, Peter B, 1990. "Organizing Debt Relief: The Need for a New Institution," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 7-18, Winter.
    16. Michael D. Bordo, 1990. "The lender of last resort : alternative views and historical experience," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Jan, pages 18-29.
    17. Diaz-Alejandro, Carlos, 1985. "Good-bye financial repression, hello financial crash," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 1-24.
    18. Stanley Fischer, 1999. "On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 85-104, Fall.
    19. Milton Friedman & Anna J. Schwartz, 1963. "A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number frie63-1, Enero.
    20. Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, 1984. "Latin American Debt: I Don't Think We Are in Kansas Anymore," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 15(2), pages 335-403.
    21. Jong-Wha Lee & Eduardo Borensztein, 2000. "Financial Crisis and Credit Crunch in Korea; Evidence From Firm-Level Data," IMF Working Papers 00/25, International Monetary Fund.
    22. Fischer, Stanley, 1997. "Applied Economics in Action: IMF Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 23-27, May.
    23. Charles W. Calomiris & Eugene N. White, 1994. "The Origins of Federal Deposit Insurance," NBER Chapters, in: The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy, pages 145-188 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    24. Cohen, Benjamin J., 1982. "Balance-of-payments financing: evolution of a regime," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(02), pages 457-478, March.
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