Would collective action clauses raise borrowing costs? - an update and additional results
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- Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 2000. "Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? An Update and Additional Results," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt46p4z4c4, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, 2001. "Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? An Update and Additional Results," International Finance 0012003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 2000. "Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? An Update and Additional Results," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series qt46p4z4c4, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
References listed on IDEAS
- Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 2000.
"Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? An Update and Additional Results,"
Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series
qt46p4z4c4, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 2000. "Would collective action clauses raise borrowing costs? - an update and additional results," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2363, The World Bank.
- Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, 2001. "Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? An Update and Additional Results," International Finance 0012003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 2000. "Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? An Update and Additional Results," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt46p4z4c4, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 1999.
"Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2343, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, 2000. "Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?," NBER Working Papers 7458, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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