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The End of Gatekeeping: Underwriters and the Quality of Sovereign Bond Markets, 1815-2007

  • Marc Flandreau
  • Juan H. Flores
  • Norbert Gaillard
  • Sebastián Nieto-Parra

We provide a comparison of salient organizational features of primary markets for foreign government debt over the very long run. We focus on output, quality control, information provision, competition, pricing, charging, and signaling. We find that the market setup experienced a radical transformation in the recent period, and we interpret this as resulting from the rise of liability insurance provided by rating agencies. Underwriters have given up their former role as gatekeepers of liquidity and certification agencies to become aggressive competitors in a new Speculative Grade market.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 15128.

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Date of creation: Jul 2009
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Publication status: published as Marc Flandreau & Juan H. Flores & Norbert Gaillard & Sebasti�n Nieto‐Parra, 2010. "The End of Gatekeeping: Underwriters and the Quality of Sovereign Bond Markets, 1815–2007," NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(1), pages 53 - 92.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15128
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