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The End of Gatekeeping: Underwriters and the Quality of Sovereign Bond Markets, 1815–2007

  • Marc Flandreau
  • Juan H. Flores
  • Norbert Gaillard
  • Sebastián Nieto-Parra

We provide a comparison of salient organizational features of primary markets for foreign government debt over the very long run. We focus on output, quality control, information provision, competition, pricing, charging, and signaling. We find that the market setup experienced a radical transformation in the recent period, and we interpret this as resulting from the rise of liability insurance provided by rating agencies. Underwriters have given up their former role as gatekeepers of liquidity and certification agencies to become aggressive competitors in a new Speculative Grade market.

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Paper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series Working Papers CEB with number 10-017.RS.

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Length: 47 p.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by:
Handle: RePEc:sol:wpaper:10-017
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