Reform Of The International Financial System And Institutions In Light Of The Asian Financial Crisis
When East Asian countries came under speculative attacks in 1997, some of them were not able to defend themselves, and subsequently had to seek the financial assistance of IMF and accept its stabilization programmes. These crisis-hit countries were criticized for not having restructured their financial, corporate, and public sectors along the lines suggested by the Washington consensus. This failure was singled out as the main cause of the crisis and, understandably, these crisis-hit countries were subject to heavy doses of structural reforms. The East Asian crisis became contagious, even threatening the stability of major international financial centres. The severity and contagiousness of the East Asian crisis underscored the importance of, and renewed interest in, reforming the international financial system. Numerous proposals have been put forward. The G-7-led reform, however, has concentrated its efforts on reforming the financial and corporate sectors of developing economies, while by and large ignoring the problems of the supply side of international finance. As was the case in the Mexican crisis of 1994/95, the appetite for radical reform of the international financial system has receded considerably in the wake of global recovery. The ongoing debate on the future direction of the international financial reform in fact suggests that most of the problems that beset the international financial system are likely to remain unchanged. This pessimistic outlook arouses deep concern in developing countries lest they remain vulnerable to future financial crises, even if they faithfully carry out the kinds of reform recommended by IMF and the World Bank. Given this reality, developing countries may have to develop a defence mechanism of their own by instituting a system of capital control and adopting an exchange rate system that lies somewhere between the two corner solutions.
|Date of creation:||2001|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Palais des Nations, CH - 1211 Geneva 10|
Phone: +41 22 907 12 34
Fax: +41 22 907 00 43
Web page: http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2101&lang=1
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rodrik, Dani, 2000.
"Institutions For High-Quality Growth: What They Are And How To Acquire Them,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2370, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dani Rodrik, 2006. "Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them," Chapters, in: Institutions, Globalisation and Empowerment, chapter 2 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Dani Rodrik, 2000. "Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They are and How to Acquire Them," NBER Working Papers 7540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Marcus H. Miller & Lei Zhang, 1999.
"Sovereign Liquidity Crisis: The Strategic Case for A Payments Standstill,"
Working Paper Series
WP99-8, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
- Miller, Marcus & Zhang, Lei, 2000. "Sovereign Liquidity Crises: The Strategic Case for a Payments Standstill," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(460), pages 335-62, January.
- Miller, Marcus & Zhang, Lei, 1998. "Sovereign Liquidity Crises: the Strategic Case for a Payments Standstill," CEPR Discussion Papers 1820, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marcus Miller & Lei Zhang, 1999. "Sovereign Liquidity Crisis: The Strategic Case for a Payments Standstill," CSGR Working papers series 35/99, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick.
- Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 1999.
"Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2343, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, 2000. "Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?," NBER Working Papers 7458, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ueda, Kazuo, 1998. "The East Asian Economic Crisis: A Japanese Perspective," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(2), pages 327-38, December.
- Andrew K. Rose, 1999. "Is there a case for an Asian Monetary Fund?," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue dec17.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2000. "Capital Market Liberalization, Economic Growth, and Instability," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 1075-1086, June.
- Benjamin M. Friedman, 2000. "Debt Restructuring," NBER Working Papers 7722, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael D. Bordo & Bruce Mizrach & Anna J. Schwartz, 1995. "Real Versus Pseudo-International Systemic Risk: Some Lessons from History," NBER Working Papers 5371, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chang, Roberto & Velasco, Andres, 2000.
"Financial Fragility and the Exchange Rate Regime,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 1-34, May.
- Roberto Chang & Andres Velasco, 1997. "Financial fragility and the exchange rate regime," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 97-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Chang, R. & Velasco, A., 1998. "Financial Fragility and the Exchange Rate Regime," Working Papers 98-05, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Roberto Chang & Andres Velasco, 1998. "Financial Fragility and the Exchange Rate Regime," NBER Working Papers 6469, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sebastian Edwards, 1999.
"How Effective Are Capital Controls?,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 65-84, Fall.
- Morris Goldstein, 2000. "Strengthening the International Financial Architecture: Where Do We Stand?," Working Paper Series WP00-8, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
- Michael P. Dooley, 2000. "Can Output Losses Following International Financial Crises be Avoided?," NBER Working Papers 7531, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:unc:g24pap:12. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joerg Mayer)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.