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La répudiation : une décision de dernier ressort en l'absence de mécanisme de gestion ordonnée des crises de la dette souveraine

Author

Listed:
  • Claire Barraud

    (UGA UFR FEG - Université Grenoble Alpes - Faculté d'Économie de Grenoble - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019], CREPPEM - Centre de Recherche Économique sur les Politiques Publiques dans une Économie de Marché - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2)

Abstract

L'Equateur a répudié une large partie de sa dette commerciale portant sur les Bonos Global le 20 novembre dernier. Compte tenu de l'histoire de l'endettement du pays, partagée par de nombreux pays qui ont subi la crise de la dette des années 1980, le but est dans un premier temps de montrer que cette décision unilatérale est légitime, voire même salutaire. Dans un second temps, il s'agira de voir qu'une telle décision pourrait néanmoins être épargnée au Gouvernement s'il existait un mécanisme de restructuration de la dette souveraine permettant à la fois de prendre en compte les intérêts du débiteur, et plus seulement l'opinion des marchés, et de légitimer le contrôle sur les mouvements des capitaux. Au-delà, compte tenu des défaillances récurrentes du système financier international, il est nécessaire de procéder à une réforme de fond qui s'envisage à travers la régulation de ce dernier hors-marché.

Suggested Citation

  • Claire Barraud, 2009. "La répudiation : une décision de dernier ressort en l'absence de mécanisme de gestion ordonnée des crises de la dette souveraine," Post-Print hal-05396063, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05396063
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05396063v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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