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La Répudiation de la Dette Souveraine et ses Conséquences : Le Cas de l’Equateur

Author

Listed:
  • Claire Barraud

    (UGA UFR FEG - Université Grenoble Alpes - Faculté d'Économie de Grenoble - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019])

Abstract

Ecuador has recently repudiated a large share of its commercial debt. Given the country's debt history, the first section of the article shows that this decision can be regarded as legitimate, and even necessary. The second section nevertheless examines the negative consequences highlighted in the existing literature on this topic, and counters them with practical arguments intended to demonstrate their uncertain and therefore relative nature.

Suggested Citation

  • Claire Barraud, 2009. "La Répudiation de la Dette Souveraine et ses Conséquences : Le Cas de l’Equateur," Post-Print hal-05396224, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05396224
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05396224v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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