IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/stm/dpaper/8.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Finding complementarities in IMF and RFA toolkits

Author

Listed:
  • Gong Cheng

    (ESM)

  • Dominika Miernik

    (ESM)

  • Teuta Turani

    (ESM)

Abstract

This work takes stock, using a comparative approach, of the existing IMF and RFA toolboxes, and the related lending policies. The paper first aims to serve as a manual on IMF and RFA lending toolkits and policies. It also highlights the similarities and differences across institutions to facilitate collective reflections on potential ways to enhance inter-institutional cooperation for common member state assistance. The paper recommends the IMF and RFAs leverage their instrument diversity, align policy frameworks where possible, and share experience in programme design as well as instrument and lending policy development.

Suggested Citation

  • Gong Cheng & Dominika Miernik & Teuta Turani, 2020. "Finding complementarities in IMF and RFA toolkits," Discussion Papers 8, European Stability Mechanism, revised 25 Oct 2021.
    • Handle: RePEc:stm:dpaper:8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/files/document/esmcomplementaritytools16042020.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Mussa, 1999. "Reforming the International Financial Architecture: Limiting Moral Hazard and Containing Real Hazard," RBA Annual Conference Volume (Discontinued), in: David Gruen & Luke Gower (ed.),Capital Flows and the International Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    2. Cheng, Gong & Lennkh, Rudolf Alvise, 2018. "RFAs' Financial Structures and Lending Capacities: a Statutory, Accounting and Credit Rating Perspective," MPRA Paper 95754, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Ostry, Jonathan D. & Jeanne, Olivier & Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, 2008. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," CEPR Discussion Papers 7022, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Erce, Aitor & Uy, Timothy, 2018. "Debt Sustainability and the Terms of Official Support," CEPR Discussion Papers 13292, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Chalongphob SUSSANGKARN, 2011. "Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: Origin, Development, and Outlook," Asian Economic Policy Review, Japan Center for Economic Research, vol. 6(2), pages 203-220, December.
    6. Gong Cheng & Dominika Miernik & Yisr Barnieh & Beomhee Han & Ika Mustika Sari & Faith Qiying Pang & Tigran Kostanyan & Alexander Efimov & Marie Houdart & Alexandra de Carvalho & Carlos Giraldo & Vivia, 2018. "IMF–RFA collaboration: motives, state of play, and way forward," Discussion Papers 4, European Stability Mechanism, revised 27 Oct 2021.
    7. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2011. "From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 1676-1706, August.
    8. Stracca, Livio & Scheubel, Beatrice, 2016. "What do we know about the global financial safety net? Rationale, data and possible evolution," Occasional Paper Series 177, European Central Bank.
    9. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Guimaraes, Bernardo & Roubini, Nouriel, 2006. "International lending of last resort and moral hazard: A model of IMF's catalytic finance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 441-471, April.
    10. Olivier Jeanne, 2010. "Dealing with Volatile Capital Flows," Policy Briefs PB10-18, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    11. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2005. "The Mussa Theorem (and Other Results on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard)," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 52(si), pages 1-5.
    12. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2001. "International bailouts, moral hazard and conditionality," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 16(33), pages 408-432.
    13. Mr. Atish R. Ghosh & Mr. Juan Zalduendo & Mr. Alun H. Thomas & Mr. Jun I Kim & Ms. Uma Ramakrishnan & Mr. Bikas Joshi, 2008. "IMF Support and Crisis Prevention," IMF Occasional Papers 2008/004, International Monetary Fund.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Cheng, Gong & Lennkh, Rudolf Alvise, 2018. "RFAs' Financial Structures and Lending Capacities: a Statutory, Accounting and Credit Rating Perspective," MPRA Paper 95754, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Evgeny Vinokurov & Artem Levenkov, 2021. "The Enlarged Global Financial Safety Net," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 12(1), pages 15-23, February.
    3. Gong Cheng, 2020. "The 2012 private sector involvement in Greece," Discussion Papers 11, European Stability Mechanism, revised 25 Oct 2021.
    4. Graciela Schiliuk & Tullio Buccellato & Jens Lapointe-Rohde & Georgios Palaiodimos & Habib Attia & Marthe Memoracion Hinojales & Catharine Kho & Gennady Vasiliev & Tigran Kostanyan & Alexandra de Carv, 2021. "Regional responses to the Covid-19 crisis: a comparative study from economic, policy, and institutional perspectives," Discussion Papers 18, European Stability Mechanism, revised 08 Nov 2021.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Scheubel, Beatrice & Stracca, Livio, 2019. "What do we know about the global financial safety net? A new comprehensive data set," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    2. Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2005. "Country Insurance," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 52(si), pages 1-6.
    3. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2019_025 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Pancrazi, Roberto & Seoane, Hernán D. & Vukotić, Marija, 2020. "Welfare gains of bailouts in a sovereign default model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    5. Perazzi, Elena, 2020. "Sovereign Bailouts and Moral Hazard with Strategic Default," MPRA Paper 108004, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 May 2021.
    6. Spiros Bougheas & Indraneel Dasgupta & Oliver Morrissey, 2011. "Repayment versus Investment Conditions and Exclusivity in Lending Contracts," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(2), pages 247-265, June.
    7. IRC Taskforce on IMF Issues, 2018. "Strengthening the Global Financial Safety Net," Occasional Paper Series 207, European Central Bank.
    8. Boz, Emine, 2011. "Sovereign default, private sector creditors, and the IFIs," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 70-82, January.
    9. Stracca, Livio & Scheubel, Beatrice, 2016. "What do we know about the global financial safety net? Rationale, data and possible evolution," Occasional Paper Series 177, European Central Bank.
    10. Ostry, Jonathan D. & Jeanne, Olivier & Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, 2008. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," CEPR Discussion Papers 7022, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Pancrazi, Roberto & Seoane, Hernán D. & Vukotić, Marija, 2020. "Welfare gains of bailouts in a sovereign default model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    12. Nada Azmy Elberry & Frank Naert & Stijn Goeminne, 2023. "Optimal public debt composition during debt crises: A review of theoretical literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 351-376, April.
    13. Noy, Ilan, 2008. "Sovereign default risk, the IMF and creditor moral hazard," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 64-78, February.
    14. Cheng, Gong, 2015. "The Global Financial Safety Net through the Prism of G20 Summits," MPRA Paper 68070, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Nov 2015.
    15. Bastidon, Cécile & Gilles, Philippe & Huchet, Nicolas, 2008. "The international lender of last resort and selective bail-out," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 144-152, June.
    16. Shim, Ilhyock & Sharma, Sunil & Chami, Ralph, 2008. "A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 2, pages 1-41.
    17. Horn, Sebastian & Reinhart, Carmen M. & Trebesch, Christoph, 2021. "China's overseas lending," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    18. Michal Szkup, 2022. "Preventing Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises: A Global Games Approach," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 43, pages 22-55, January.
    19. Scheubel, Beatrice & Tafuro, Andrea & Vonessen, Benjamin, 2018. "Stigma? What stigma? A contribution to the debate on financial market effects of IMF lending," Working Paper Series 2198, European Central Bank.
    20. Luca Papi & Andrea F Presbitero & Alberto Zazzaro, 2015. "IMF Lending and Banking Crises," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 63(3), pages 644-691, November.
    21. Lee, Jong-Wha & Shin, Kwanho, 2008. "IMF bailouts and moral hazard," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 816-830, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:stm:dpaper:8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Karol SISKIND (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/efseulu.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.