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The Long and the Short of It: Sovereign Debt Crises and Debt Maturity

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  • Raquel Fernández
  • Alberto Martin

Abstract

We present a simple model of sovereign debt crises in which a country chooses its optimal mix of short and long-term bonds subject to standard contracting frictions: the country cannot commit to repay its debts nor to a specific path of future debt issues, and contracts cannot be made state contingent nor renegotiated. We show that, in order to reduce incentives to engage in debt dilution, the country must issue short-term debt. This exposes it to roll-over crises and inefficient repayments. We examine the effects of alternative restructuring regimes, which either write-down debt or extend its maturity in the event of crises, and show that both necessarily improve ex ante welfare if they do not decrease expected payments to creditors during crises. In particular, we show that the way in which these regimes redistribute payments between short- and long-term creditors, which has been a central point in recent policy debates, is inconsequential.

Suggested Citation

  • Raquel Fernández & Alberto Martin, 2014. "The Long and the Short of It: Sovereign Debt Crises and Debt Maturity," NBER Working Papers 20786, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20786
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    Cited by:

    1. Dvorkin, Maximiliano & Sánchez, Juan M. & Sapriza, Horacio & Yurdagul, Emircan, 2022. "Improving sovereign debt restructurings," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    2. Gomez-Gonzalez, Patricia, 2019. "Inflation-linked public debt in emerging economies," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 313-334.
    3. Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes & Pierre Yared, 2018. "Optimal Fiscal Policy without Commitment: Beyond Lucas-Stokey," NBER Working Papers 24522, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Tamon Asonuma & Marcos Chamon & Aitor Erce & Akira Sasahara, 2019. "Costs of sovereign defaults: Restructuring strategies, bank distress and the capital inflow-credit channel," Working Papers 37, European Stability Mechanism.
    5. Tamon Asonuma & Christoph Trebesch, 2016. "Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Preemptive Or Post-Default," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 175-214, February.
    6. Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes & Pierre Yared, 2021. "Optimal Fiscal Policy without Commitment: Revisiting Lucas-Stokey," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(5), pages 1640-1665.
    7. Leonardo Martinez & Juan Hatchondo, 2017. "Sovereign Cocos and the Reprofiling of Debt Payments," 2017 Meeting Papers 1435, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Forni, L. & Pisani, M., 2018. "Sovereign Restructuring Vs. Fiscal Adjustment In A Monetary Union: Macroeconomic Effects From Model-Based Simulations," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 470-500, March.
    9. Asonuma, Tamon & Niepelt, Dirk & Ranciere, Romain, 2023. "Sovereign bond prices, haircuts and maturity," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    10. Mattia Osvaldo Picarelli, 2016. "Debt Overhang and Sovereign Debt Restructuring," Working Papers 9/16, Sapienza University of Rome, DISS.
    11. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Yasin Kürsat Önder & Francisco Roch, 2022. "Sovereign Cocos," Working Papers 139, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
      • Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Mr. Leonardo Martinez & Kursat Onder & Mr. Francisco Roch, 2022. "Sovereign Cocos," IMF Working Papers 2022/078, International Monetary Fund.
    12. Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Deadly Embrace: Sovereign and Financial Balance Sheets Doom Loops," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 85(3), pages 1781-1823.
    13. Alberola, Enrique & Cheng, Gong & Consiglio, Andrea & Zenios, Stavros A., 2023. "Unconventional monetary policy and debt sustainability in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    14. Tamon Asonuma & Hyungseok Joo, 2021. "Public Capital and Fiscal Constraint in Sovereign Debt Crises," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0621, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    15. Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes & Pierre Yared, 2017. "Optimal Time-Consistent Government Debt Maturity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 132(1), pages 55-102.
    16. Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes & Pierre Yared, 2022. "The Commitment Benefit of Consols in Government Debt Management," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 255-270, June.
    17. Enrique Alberola-Ila & Gong Cheng & Andrea Consiglio & Stavros A. Zenios, 2022. "Debt sustainability and monetary policy: the case of ECB asset purchases," BIS Working Papers 1034, Bank for International Settlements.
    18. Tamon Asonuma & Hyungseok Joo, 2023. "Sovereign Defaults and Debt Restructurings: Public Capital and Fiscal Constraint Tightness," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0323, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    19. Mr. Damiano Sandri, 2015. "Dealing with Systemic Sovereign Debt Crises: Fiscal Consolidation, Bail-ins or Official Transfers?," IMF Working Papers 2015/223, International Monetary Fund.
    20. Juan Sanchez & Rodolfo Manuelli, 2016. "Endogenous Debt Maturity: Liquidity Risk vs. Default Risk," 2016 Meeting Papers 1435, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    21. Perez, Diego J., 2017. "Sovereign debt maturity structure under asymmetric information," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 243-259.
    22. Flavia Corneli, 2024. "Sovereign debt maturity structure and its costs," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 31(1), pages 262-297, February.
    23. Carmen M. Reinhart & Christoph Trebesch, 2016. "Sovereign Debt Relief and Its Aftermath," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 215-251.
    24. Costa Cabral, Nazaré, 2020. "Sovereign Bond-Baked Securities in EMU:Do they mean accrued safety in the European sovereign debt market or simply a way to ‘privatize’ public debt?," MPRA Paper 102248, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration

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