LDC Debt: Forgiveness, Indexation, and Investment Incentives
We compare different indexation schemes in terms of their ability to facilitate forgiveness and reduce the investment disincentives associated with the large LDC debt overhang. Indexing to an endogenous variable (e.g., a country's output) has a negative moral hazard effect on investment, This problem does not arise when payments are linked to an exogenous variable such as commodity prices. Nonetheless, indexing payments to output may be useful when debtors know more about their willingness to invest than lenders. We also reach new conclusions about the desirability of default penalties under asymmetric information.
|Date of creation:||Mar 1988|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as "LDC Debt: Forgiveness, Indexation, and Investment Incentives." From Journal of Finance, Vol. 44, No. 5, pp. 1335-1350, (December 1989).|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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- Martin Feldstein, 1988. "International Economic Cooperation," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number feld88-4.
- Jean Tirole & Jean-Jaques Laffont, 1985.
"Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms,"
368, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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