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IMF Lending in Times of Crisis: Political Influences and Crisis Prevention

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  • Presbitero, Andrea F.
  • Zazzaro, Alberto

Abstract

In the wake of the global crisis the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has increased its exposure to developing countries and modified its lending approach to enhance its crisis prevention role. In this paper we examine whether, during the current crisis, IMF lending was actually directed at preventing the spread of the crisis and whether participation in IMF programs was sensitive to the politico-economic interests of the Fund’s main shareholders. We find that the political similarity with G7 countries is positively correlated with the probability of entering a loan agreement, while the harsher the crisis and the exposure of foreign banks in the country, the larger the loan granted by the IMF.

Suggested Citation

  • Presbitero, Andrea F. & Zazzaro, Alberto, 2012. "IMF Lending in Times of Crisis: Political Influences and Crisis Prevention," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(10), pages 1944-1969.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:40:y:2012:i:10:p:1944-1969
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.04.009
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    Cited by:

    1. Luca Papi & Andrea F Presbitero & Alberto Zazzaro, 2015. "IMF Lending and Banking Crises," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 63(3), pages 644-691, November.
    2. Blanton, Robert G. & Blanton, Shannon Lindsey & Peksen, Dursun, 2015. "Financial Crises and Labor: Does Tight Money Loosen Labor Rights?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 1-12.
    3. Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos & Ladeira, Carlos Eduardo de Almeida, 2015. "The determinants of IMF fiscal conditionalities: economics or politics?," Textos para discussão 391, FGV/EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
    4. Bal Gündüz, Yasemin, 2016. "The Economic Impact of Short-term IMF Engagement in Low-Income Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 30-49.
    5. Li, Larry & Sy, Malick & McMurray, Adela, 2015. "Insights into the IMF bailout debate: A review and research agenda," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 891-914.
    6. Irina Andone & Beatrice D. Scheubel, 2017. "Memorable Encounters? Own and Neighbours' Experience with IMF Conditionality and IMF Stigma," CESifo Working Paper Series 6399, CESifo Group Munich.
    7. Ha, Eunyoung & Kang, Myung-koo, 2015. "Government Policy Responses to Financial Crises: Identifying Patterns and Policy Origins in Developing Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 264-281.
    8. Christian Mumssen & Yasemin Bal Gunduz & Christian H Ebeke & Linda Kaltani, 2013. "IMF-Supported Programs in Low Income Countries; Economic Impact over the Short and Longer Term," IMF Working Papers 13/273, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Calixte Ahokpossi & Laurence Allain & Giovanna Bua, 2014. "A Constrained Choice? Impact of Concessionality Requirements on Borrowing Behavior," IMF Working Papers 14/176, International Monetary Fund.

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