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IMF surveillance and financial markets--A political economy analysis

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  • Fratzscher, Marcel
  • Reynaud, Julien

Abstract

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is in the process of re-inventing itself with bilateral and multilateral surveillance emerging as a key function. The paper analyses how IMF surveillance announcements may be influenced by political power that member countries exert at the IMF. First, we analyze the content of Article IV Public Information Notices (PIN), and second, we use the financial market reaction to the released PINs as tools to identify the role of political economy factors for IMF surveillance. For a set of emerging market economies, the paper finds that financial markets react more favorable to PIN releases for politically influential member countries. Moreover, IMF surveillance appears to be systematically more favorable for countries with larger IMF loans outstanding, consistent with the finding in the literature that the IMF may engage in [`]defensive surveillance'.

Suggested Citation

  • Fratzscher, Marcel & Reynaud, Julien, 2011. "IMF surveillance and financial markets--A political economy analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 405-422, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:27:y:2011:i:3:p:405-422
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    Cited by:

    1. Menegaki, Angeliki N. & Ozturk, Ilhan, 2013. "Growth and energy nexus in Europe revisited: Evidence from a fixed effects political economy model," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 881-887.
    2. Yu-Fu Chen & Michael Funke, 2010. "Global Warming And Extreme Events: Rethinking The Timing And Intensity Of Environmental Policy," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 236, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
    3. Dreher, Axel & Richert, Katharina, 2017. "The Political Economy of International Finance Corporation Lending," CEPR Discussion Papers 12290, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    5. repec:ilo:ilowps:478371 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Islam, Iyanatul. & Ahmed, Ishraq. & Roy, Rathin. & Ramos, Raquel., 2012. "Macroeconomic policy advice and the Article IV consultations a development perspective," ILO Working Papers 994783713402676, International Labour Organization.
    7. Weisbrot, Mark. & Jorgensen, Helene., 2013. "Macroeconomic policy advice and the article IV consultations comparative overview of European Union member states," ILO Working Papers 994855133402676, International Labour Organization.
    8. Andreas Fuchs & Kai Gehring, 2017. "The Home Bias in Sovereign Ratings," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(6), pages 1386-1423.
    9. Axel Dreher & Katharina Michaelowa, 2008. "The political economy of international organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 331-334, December.
    10. Frenkel, Michael & Rülke, Jan-Christoph & Zimmermann, Lilli, 2013. "Do private sector forecasters chase after IMF or OECD forecasts?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 217-229.
    11. repec:eee:deveco:v:130:y:2018:i:c:p:1-16 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati & Arusha Cooray, 2015. "Do transparency initiatives work? Assessing the impact of the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) on data transparency," CAMA Working Papers 2015-24, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    IMF Surveillance Political economy Sovereign spreads Financial markets Emerging market economies;

    JEL classification:

    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F40 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - General

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