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The Political Economy of International Organizations

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  • Axel Dreher
  • Valentin F. Lang

Abstract

We review the literature on the political economy of international organizations (IOs). Considering IOs as products of the preferences of various actors rather than monolithic entities we focus on national politicians, international bureaucrats, interest groups, and voters. By looking into the details of decision-making in IOs the literature shows that a focus on states as the prime actors in IOs overlooks important facets of the empirical reality. Mainly focusing on empirical research, we structure the paper according to the four main actors involved and examine how they influence, use, and shape IOs. We find that IO behavior often reflects the interests of politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups, while the impact of voters is limited. The final section discusses proposals for reforms addressing this weak representation of voter preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Axel Dreher & Valentin F. Lang, 2016. "The Political Economy of International Organizations," CESifo Working Paper Series 6077, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6077
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    5. Ludger Schuknecht & Vincent Siegerink, 2021. "The Political Economy of the International Tax Transparency Agenda in the G20/OECD Context," CESifo Working Paper Series 8813, CESifo.
    6. Schuknecht, Ludger & Siegerink, Vincent, 2020. "The political economy of the G20 agenda on financial regulation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    7. Krahnke, Tobias, 2020. "Doing more with less: The catalytic function of IMF lending and the role of program size," Discussion Papers 18/2020, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    8. Bernhard Reinsberg & Thomas Stubbs & Alexander Kentikelenis & Lawrence King, 2020. "Bad governance: How privatization increases corruption in the developing world," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(4), pages 698-717, October.
    9. Kai Gehring & Valentin F. Lang, 2018. "Stigma or Cushion? IMF Programs and Sovereign Creditworthiness," CESifo Working Paper Series 7339, CESifo.
    10. Weinlich, Silke & Baumann, Max-Otto & Lundsgaarde, Erik & Wolff, Peter, 2020. "Earmarking in the multilateral development system: Many shades of grey," IDOS Studies, German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), volume 101, number 101.
    11. Florian Kiesow Cortez & Jerg Gutmann, 2021. "Domestic Institutions and the Ratification of International Agreements in a Panel of Democracies," International Law and Economics, in: Florian Kiesow Cortez (ed.), The Political Economy of International Agreements, pages 37-62, Springer.
    12. Rau-Goehring, Matthias & Reinsberg, Bernhard & Kern, Andreas, 2020. "The role of IMF conditionality for central bank independence," Working Paper Series 2464, European Central Bank.
    13. Franck A. Malan, 2018. "Does being an IMF executive board member (Re)pay? An examination of IMF loans and repayments," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(10), pages 2669-2690, October.
    14. Max‐Otto Baumann, 2021. "How earmarking has become self‐perpetuating in United Nations development co‐operation," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 39(3), pages 343-359, May.
    15. Kern, Andreas & Reinsberg, Bernhard & Rau-Göhring, Matthias, 2019. "IMF conditionality and central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 212-229.
    16. Eichenauer, Vera Z. & Fuchs, Andreas & Brueckner, Lutz, 2018. "The Effects of Trade, Aid, and Investment on China's Image in Developing Countries," Working Papers 0646, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    17. Lang, Valentin F. & Presbitero, Andrea F., 2018. "Room for discretion? Biased decision-making in international financial institutions," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 1-16.
    18. Bernhard Reinsberg & Alexander Kentikelenis & Thomas Stubbs & Lawrence King & Centre for Business Research, 2018. "The World System & the Hollowing-out of State Capacity: How Structural Adjustment Programs Impact Bureaucratic Quality in Developing Countries," Working Papers wp503, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    international organizations; public choice; International Monetary Fund; European Union;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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