Staff Growth in International Organizations: A Principal-Agent Problem? An Empirical Analysis
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Roland Vaubel & Axel Dreher & Uğurlu Soylu, 2007. "Staff growth in international organizations: A principal-agent problem? An empirical analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 275-295, December.
References listed on IDEAS
- Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Ludger Schuknecht, 2005.
"What does the European Union do?,"
Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 275-319, June.
- Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Ludger Schuknecht, 2001. "What Does the European Union Do?," NBER Working Papers 8647, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Ludger Schuknecht, 2002. "What Does the European Union Do?," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 61, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
- Alesina, Alberto F & Angeloni, Ignazio & Schuknecht, Ludger, 2002. "What Does the European Union Do?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3115, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Ludger Schuknecht, 2001. "What Does the European Union Do?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1935, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Schuknecht, Ludger & Angeloni, Ignazio & Alesina, Alberto, 2005. "What Does The European Union Do?," Scholarly Articles 4553010, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Vaubel, Roland, 1994.
"The Political Economy of Centralization and the European Community,"
Springer, vol. 81(1-2), pages 151-190, October.
- Vaubel Roland, 1992. "The Political Economy Of Centralization And The European Community," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-38, March.
- Axel Dreher, 2003. "The influence of elections on IMF programme interruptions," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(6), pages 101-120.
- Nielson, Daniel L. & Tierney, Michael J., 2003. "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(02), pages 241-276, March.
- Lake, David A., 1996. "Anarchy, hierarchy, and the variety of international relations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(01), pages 1-33, December.
- Bruno Frey & Alois Stutzer, 2006. "Reply to Gordon Tullock," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 47-48, March.
- Axel Dreher, 2004. "The Influence of IMF Programs on the Re-election of Debtor Governments," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(1), pages 53-76, March.
- Frey, Bruno S., 1984. "The public choice view of international political economy," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(01), pages 199-223, December.
- Barnett, Michael N. & Finnemore, Martha, 1999. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(04), pages 699-732, September.
- Streit, Manfred E. & Voigt, Stefan, 1996. "Toward ever closer union--or ever larger? Or both? Entry to the European Union from the perspective of constitutional economics," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 385-388, September.
- Przeworski, Adam & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2000. "The effect of IMF programs on economic growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 385-421, August.
- Pollack, Mark A., 1997. "Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(01), pages 99-134, December.
- Roland Vaubel, 1986. "A public choice approach to international organization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 39-57, January.
- Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991.
"Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
- Tom Doan, "undated". "RATS program to replicate Arellano-Bond 1991 dynamic panel," Statistical Software Components RTZ00169, Boston College Department of Economics.
More about this item
Keywordspolitical economy; principal-agent problem; bureaucratic inefficiency; international organizations;
- H79 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0306006. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA). General contact details of provider: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de .