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Report NEP-PBE-2003-07-04
This is the archive for NEP-PBE, a report on new working papers in the area of Public Economics. Thomas Andrén (Thomas Andren) issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-PBE
The following items were announced in this report:
- Roland Vaubel & Axel Dreher & Ugurlu Soylu, 2003, "Staff Growth in International Organizations: A Principal-Agent Problem? An Empirical Analysis," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 0306006, Jun, revised 06 Sep 2003.
- Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, 2003, "Explaining de facto judicial independence," Law and Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 0306001, Jun.
- Axel Dreher & Lars-H.R. Siemers, 2003, "The Intriguing Nexus Between Corruption and Capital Account Restrictions," Development and Comp Systems, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 0306004, Jun, revised 07 Jul 2005.
- Giorgio Coricelli & Dietmar Fehr & Gerlinde Fellner, 2003, "Partner selection in public goods experiments," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, number 2003-13, Jun.
- Loren Brandt & Matthew A. Turner, 2003, "The Usefulness of Corruptible Elections," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number brandt-03-01, Jul.
- Rodrigo J. Harrison, 2003, "Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Substitutes," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 0306003, Jun.