The influence of elections on IMF programme interruptions
Using panel data for 104 countries between 1975 and 1998, this article tries to explain interruptions of IMF programmes around election dates in the recipient countries. On average, programmes seem to be more likely to break down before elections. This increase in interruption probabilities is, however, less severe in more democratic countries. In true democracies interruption frequencies are even lower prior to elections. While no other political variables than elections and democracy were found to influence compliance systematically, programme interruptions are significantly more likely in countries with high government consumption, high levels of short-term debt and low GDP per capita at programme initiation.
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Volume (Year): 39 (2003)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
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