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The rise of supplemental lending at the World Bank

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  • Erasmus Kersting
  • Christopher Kilby

Abstract

World Bank projects sometimes receive supplemental loans months or years after initial project approval. Largely unnoticed, supplemental lending has mushroomed in the last decade, accounting for nearly 30% of all new loans in some years. These loans can serve important functions, as they come without the bureaucratic delays associated with new projects. We argue that supplemental loans are potentially useful foreign policy tools for powerful donors in settings where time is of the essence. Consistent with this, we find that countries receive significantly larger supplemental loans while serving a two‐year term on the geopolitically important United Nations Security Council. L'essor des prêts supplémentaires au sein de la Banque mondiale. Les projets de la Banque mondiale peuvent parfois bénéficier de prêts supplémentaires plusieurs mois ou années après leur validation initiale. Passant très souvent inaperçus, ces prêts supplémentaires ont proliféré au cours des dernières décennies, représentant certaines années près de 30 % de tous les nouveaux prêts accordés. Échappant aux délais bureaucratiques afférents aux nouveaux projets, ces prêts peuvent revêtir d'importantes fonctions. Nous affirmons que les prêts supplémentaires représentent d'utiles outils de politique étrangère pour les puissants donateurs dans les situations où le temps constitue un élément crucial. Dans cette optique, nous constatons que les pays reçoivent des prêts supplémentaires bien plus importants lorsqu'ils siègent pour deux ans au Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, organe éminemment important au plan géopolitique.

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  • Erasmus Kersting & Christopher Kilby, 2019. "The rise of supplemental lending at the World Bank," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(4), pages 1655-1698, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:52:y:2019:i:4:p:1655-1698
    DOI: 10.1111/caje.12415
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    Cited by:

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    3. Richard Clark & Lindsay R. Dolan, 2021. "Pleasing the Principal: U.S. Influence in World Bank Policymaking," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 36-51, January.

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    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid

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