Vulnerability, Crisis and Debt Maturity: do IMF Interventions Shorten the Length of Borrowing?
This paper studies how IMF lending affects countries' bonds maturity. Debt maturity was claimed to be one of the causes of the crisis of recent years: Too much short-term debt would be the seed of self-fulfilling crises. In turn, one of the goals of the IMF is to prevent crises and to alleviate their effects once they occur. I find that IMF interventions shorten the length of countries' borrowing which is a non desirable, and not analyzed, consequence of IMF lending. Moreover, this finding is consistent with the implications of this Institution's senior status in its lending.
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