The efficient resolution of capital account crises: how to avoid moral hazard
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- Gregor Irwin & David Vines, 2005. "The efficient resolution of capital account crises: how to avoid moral hazard," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(3), pages 233-250.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Philipp Maier, 2007. "Do We Need the IMF to Resolve a Crisis? Lessons from Past Episodes of Debt Restructuring," Staff Working Papers 07-10, Bank of Canada.
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NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-IFN-2004-11-07 (International Finance)
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