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International Monetary Fund Resources and Contagion Mechanisms: A Hypothesis


  • Francesca Viani

    () (Università degli Studi di Siena)


This paper examines analytically the possibility that, due to the limitedness of its resources, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could spread financial crises rather than preventing them, thus developing into a contagion channel. The model we build, based on the most recent global-games literature, allows us to show that this risk is sensible from a theoretical point of view. We conclude that the IMF, when planning its interventions, should take into account this kind of contagion it contributes in creating. Some policy implications are derived.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesca Viani, 2005. "International Monetary Fund Resources and Contagion Mechanisms: A Hypothesis," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 95(6), pages 69-103, November-.
  • Handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:95:y:2005:i:6:p:69-103

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Jean-Charles Rochet & Xavier Vives, 2004. "Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(6), pages 1116-1147, December.
    2. Massimo Sbracia & Andrea Zaghini, 2001. "Crises and contagion: the role of the banking system," BIS Papers chapters,in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Marrying the macro- and micro-prudential dimensions of financial stability, volume 1, pages 241-260 Bank for International Settlements.
    3. Kaminsky, Graciela L. & Reinhart, Carmen M., 2000. "On crises, contagion, and confusion," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 145-168, June.
    4. Giancarlo Corsetti & Paolo Pesenti & Nouriel Roubini & Cedric Tille, 1999. "Competitive devaluations: a welfare-based approach," Staff Reports 58, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    5. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
    6. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Guimarães, Bernardo & Roubini, Nouriel, 2004. "International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of the IMF's Catalytic Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 4383, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Adrian Penalver, 2004. "How can the IMF catalyse private capital flows? A model," Bank of England working papers 215, Bank of England.
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    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems


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