IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Is it punishment? Sovereign defaults and the decline in trade

  • Martinez, Jose Vicente
  • Sandleris, Guido

Sovereign defaults are associated with declines in defaulting countries trade. Are these declines the result of trade sanctions as the trade sanctions argument of sovereign borrowing would suggest? We devise an empirical strategy to evaluate this issue based on the idea that if trade sanctions are causing the declines, bilateral trade with creditor countries should fall more than trade with other countries. We find that this is not the case. The analysis does not yield much evidence of broader punishment strategies including a league of major creditors either. These results contradict the predictions of the trade sanctions theory of sovereign borrowing.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261560611000799
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Money and Finance.

Volume (Year): 30 (2011)
Issue (Month): 6 (October)
Pages: 909-930

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:30:y:2011:i:6:p:909-930
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30443

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Eichengreen, Barry & Portes, Richard, 1985. "Debt and Default in the 1930s: Causes and Consequences," CEPR Discussion Papers 75, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Eaton, Jonathan & Fernandez, Raquel, 1995. "Sovereign debt," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 3, pages 2031-2077 Elsevier.
  3. Lane, Philip R, 1999. "North-South Lending with Moral Hazard and Repudiation Risk," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 50-58, February.
  4. Guido Sandleris, 2008. "Sovereign Defaults: Information, Investment and Credit," Business School Working Papers 2008-04, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
  5. Ozler, Sule, 1993. "Have Commercial Banks Ignored History?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 608-20, June.
  6. Fernandez, Raquel & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1990. "Strategic Models of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 331-49, July.
  7. Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, 1996. "Determinants and impacts of sovereign credit ratings," Research Paper 9608, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  8. Bulow, J. & Rogoff, K., 1988. "Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?," Papers 411, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  9. Andrew K. Rose, 2002. "One Reason Countries Pay Their Debts: Renegotiation and International Trade," Working Papers 042002, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
  10. Eaton, Jonathan & Gersovitz, Mark, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309, April.
  11. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth S., 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Scholarly Articles 12491028, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  12. Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1997. "Reviving reputation models of international debt," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 21-30.
  13. Rose, Andrew K & Spiegel, Mark, 2002. "A Gravity Model of International Lending: Trade, Default and Credit," CEPR Discussion Papers 3539, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1989. "Sovereign Debt Repurchases: No Cure for Overhang," NBER Working Papers 2850, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. repec:att:wimass:8903 is not listed on IDEAS
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:30:y:2011:i:6:p:909-930. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.