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North-South Lending with Moral Hazard and Repudiation Risk

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  • Philip Lane

Abstract

We show that the joint presence of moral hazard and repudiation risk generates an importnat interaction effect. In order to provide the proper incentives to borrowers, the optimal financial contract under moral hazard calls for all available resources to be paid to the lender in the event of a poor realization for output. Repudiation risk limits the size of this transfer, as the debtor has the option to default. This upper bound on the resource transfer exacerbates the moral hazard problem, reducing lending and the equilibrium level of investment and output.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip Lane, 1998. "North-South Lending with Moral Hazard and Repudiation Risk," Economics Technical Papers 989, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:tcd:tcduet:989
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    File URL: http://www.tcd.ie/Economics/TEP/1998/989.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Philip R. Lane & Gian M Milesi-Ferretti, 2000. "External Capital Structure; Theory and Evidence," IMF Working Papers 00/152, International Monetary Fund.
    2. repec:trp:01jefa:jefa0007 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Martinez, Jose Vicente & Sandleris, Guido, 2011. "Is it punishment? Sovereign defaults and the decline in trade," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 909-930, October.
    4. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka & Chi-Wa Yuen, 1998. "Capital Flows with Debt-And Equity-Financed Invesment: Equilibrium Structure and Efficiency Implications," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 136, Universidad del CEMA.
    5. Anyangah, Joshua Okeyo, 2010. "Financing investment in environmentally sound technologies: Foreign direct investment versus foreign debt finance," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 456-475, August.
    6. Yong Kyun Kim, 2013. "Inequality and Sovereign Default under Democracy," European Journal of Economic and Political Studies, Fatih University, vol. 6(1), pages 5-40.
    7. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka & Chi-Wa Yuen, 2001. "Why International Equity Inflows to Emerging Markets are Inefficient and Small Relative to International Debt Flows," NBER Working Papers 8659, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

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