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Market Discipline

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Listed:
  • Timothy D. Lane

    (International Monetary Fund)

Abstract

Under what circumstances can market forces prevent unsustainable borrowing? Effective market discipline requires that capital markets be open, that information on the borrower's existing liabilities be readily available, that no bailout be anticipated, and that the borrower respond to market signals. This paper explores the implications of these conditions and reviews some relevant empirical evidence.

Suggested Citation

  • Timothy D. Lane, 1993. "Market Discipline," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 40(1), pages 53-88, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:imfstp:v:40:y:1993:i:1:p:53-88
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:onb:oenbwp:y::i:48:b:1 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Violeta Vulovic, 2017. "How well do subnational borrowing regulations work?," Chapters, in: Naoyuki Yoshino & Peter J. Morgan (ed.), Central and Local Government Relations in Asia, chapter 5, pages 161-220, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Heinemann, Friedrich & Winschel, Viktor, 2001. "Public deficits and borrowing costs: the missing half of market discipline," ZEW Discussion Papers 01-16, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    4. Friedrich Heinemann, 2000. "Does globalization restrict budgetary autonomy?," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 35(6), pages 288-298, November.
    5. Jensen, Svend Erik Hougaard & Jensen, Lars Grue, 1995. "Debt, deficits and transition to EMU: A small country analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 3-25, March.
    6. Joao do Carmo Oliveira & Jorge Martinez-Vasquez, 2001. "Czech Republic : Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the Transition," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 14027, December.
    7. Heinemann, Friedrich, 1994. "Verschuldungsanreize in der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion," ZEW Discussion Papers 94-02, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    8. F.K. Siebrits & E. Calitz, 2004. "Should South Africa Adopt Numerical Fiscal Rules?1," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 72(4), pages 759-783, September.
    9. Menz, Klaus-Michael, 2010. "Market discipline and the evaluation of Euro financial bonds--An empirical analysis," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 315-328, September.
    10. Landon, Stuart & Smith, Constance E., 2007. "Government debt spillovers in a monetary union," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 135-154, August.
    11. David VanHoose, 2007. "Evaluating the Policy Implications of the Other Two Pillars of Basel II," NFI Policy Briefs 2007-PB-08, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    12. David T. Llewellyn, 2001. "A regulatory regime for financial stability," Working Papers 48, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    13. Martin Besfamille & Ben Lockwood, 2008. "Bailouts In Federations: Is A Hard Budget Constraint Always Best?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(2), pages 577-593, May.
    14. David VanHoose, 2007. "Market Discipline and Supervisory Discretion in Banking: Reinforcing or Conflicting Pillars of Basel II?," NFI Working Papers 2007-WP-06, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    15. Philipp Paulus, 2004. "The fiscal stability impact of monetary unions - looking beneath the Stability Pact debate," Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series 05/2004, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland.
    16. Paul Hamalainen & Maximilian Hall & Barry Howcroft, 2005. "A Framework for Market Discipline in Bank Regulatory Design," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1-2), pages 183-209.
    17. Shah, Anwar, 2005. "Fiscal decentralization and fiscal performance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3786, The World Bank.
    18. Heinemann, Friedrich, 1999. "Does globalization restrict budgetary autonomy? A multidimensional approach," ZEW Discussion Papers 99-29, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    19. Paul Hamalainen & Barry Howcroft & Maximilian Hall, 2010. "Should A Mandatory Subordinated Debt Policy Be Introduced In The United Kingdom? Evidence From The Issuance Activity Of Banks And Building Societies," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(2), pages 240-263, April.
    20. Warren P. Hogan & Ian G. Sharpe, 1997. "Prudential Regulation of the Financial System: A Functional Approach," Agenda - A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics, vol. 4(1), pages 15-28.
    21. Selçuk Caner & Süheyla Özyıldırım & A. Ungan, 2012. "How Sensitive Are Bank Managers to Shareholder Value?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 42(3), pages 187-205, December.
    22. Ioannou, Demosthenes & Stracca, Livio, 2014. "Have the euro area and EU governance worked? Just the facts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 1-17.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents

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