Mandatory Subordinated Debt and the Corporate Governance of Banks
Given current debates on the future direction of bank regulatory design, the objective of this paper is to raise awareness of a new and potentially significant tool in the corporate governance of banks. Public policy proposals to improve the nature of bank regulation through private-sector solutions and, in particular, mandatory subordinated debt market discipline provide such an opportunity. This paper argues that apart from creating an additional class of bank stakeholder whose interests align with the risk-reduction objectives of the regulatory authorities, a suitable mandatory subordinated debt policy (MSDP) could also provide a new and meaningful "voice" in the corporate governance of banks. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 12 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0964-8410&site=1|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0964-8410&site=1|