A Framework for Market Discipline in Bank Regulatory Design
Given current debates on the future direction of regulatory design, the first objective of this paper is to contextualise the issues surrounding bank market discipline. Accordingly, the paper raises awareness of the current key themes within incentive-based regulatory design and analyses the theory underlying market discipline. This leads to the creation of a theoretical framework of market discipline, which provides a powerful tool for understanding the conditions necessary for effective market discipline and for assessing the findings of market discipline-related empirical research. The second objective is to emphasise the suitability of the theoretical framework for debates on contemporary market discipline and aiding future bank regulatory policy design, in particular, how to incorporate suitable, incentive mechanisms in international banking regulation. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2005.
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Volume (Year): 32 (2005-01)
Issue (Month): 1-2 ()
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