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Verschuldungsanreize in der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion

  • Heinemann, Friedrich

Die Bestimmungen zur europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (WWU) im Unionsvertrag haben die Anreize für öffentliche Verschuldung verändert. Die Analyse zeigt, daß trotz der Bemühungen, die nationale Eigenverantwortlichkeit zu bewahren, nicht mit einer effektiven Disziplinierung durch die Kapitalmärkte gerechnet werden kann. Der politische Disziplinierungsmechanismus des Vertrags ist in der zweiten Stufe der WWU mit einer wirksamen Sanktionierung versehen. Dem steht in der dritten Stufe der WWU kein Äquivalent gegenüber, so daß die Gefahr besteht, daß die Verschuldungsanreize nach dem Übergang zur Währungsunion voll zum Tragen kommen werden. ; The Maastricht Treaty, with its definition of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), has changed the incentives for national debt. Even though it has been tried to keep member states responsible for their national debt, the analysis shows that discipline solely from market pressure cannot be expected. The mechanism of political discipline of the Treaty is provided with an effective sanction in the second stage of EMU, an equivalent sanction in the third stage of EMU is missing, however. Therefore, there is the danger that debt incentives become powerful especially after the introduction of a common European currency.

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Paper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 94-02.

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Date of creation: 1994
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:9402
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  1. Friedrich Heinemann, 1993. "Sustainability of national debt in Europe," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 61-68, March.
  2. Giovannini, A. & Spaventa, L., 1990. "Fiscal Rules in the Europen Monetary Union: A No-Entry Clause," Papers 8, Roma "la Sapienza" - Scienze Economiche.
  3. Van Der Ploeg, F., 1990. "Budgetary Aspects Of Economic And Monetary Integration Inn Europe," Papers 9037, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  4. Timothy D. Lane, 1993. "Market Discipline," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 40(1), pages 53-88, March.
  5. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Roubini, Nouriel, 1992. "Tax Smoothing Discretion Versus Balanced Budget Rules in the Presence of Politically Motivated Fiscal Deficits: The Design of Optimal Fiscal Rules for Europe after 1992," CEPR Discussion Papers 682, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. A. Lans Bovenberg & Jeroen J. M. Kremers & Paul R. Masson, 1991. "Economic and Monetary Union in Europe and Constraints on National Budgetary Policies," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 38(2), pages 374-398, June.
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