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Should South Africa Adopt Numerical Fiscal Rules?1

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  • F.K. SIEBRITS
  • E. CALITZ

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  • F.K. Siebrits & E. Calitz, 2004. "Should South Africa Adopt Numerical Fiscal Rules?1," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 72(4), pages 759-783, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:sajeco:v:72:y:2004:i:4:p:759-783
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1813-6982.2004.tb00133.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer, 2005. "Reinventing Fiscal Policy," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Blandine Laperche & Dimitri Uzunidis (ed.), John Kenneth Galbraith and the Future of Economics, chapter 9, pages 105-125, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Henry C. Simons, 1936. "Rules versus Authorities in Monetary Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(1), pages 1-1.
    3. John B. Taylor, 2000. "Reassessing Discretionary Fiscal Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 21-36, Summer.
    4. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1995. "The Political Economy of Budget Deficits," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 42(1), pages 1-31, March.
    5. Mosley, Layna, 2000. "Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 737-773, October.
    6. Eichenbaum, Martin, 1997. "Some Thoughts on Practical Stabilization Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 236-239, May.
    7. Marco Buti & Sylvester Eijffinger & Daniele Franco, 2003. "Revisiting EMU's Stability Pact: A Pragmatic Way Forward," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 19(1), pages 100-111.
    8. Olivier Blanchard & Roberto Perotti, 2002. "An Empirical Characterization of the Dynamic Effects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on Output," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(4), pages 1329-1368.
    9. Timothy D. Lane, 1993. "Market Discipline," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 40(1), pages 53-88, March.
    10. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fofana, Ismael & Goundan, Anatole & Magne, Léa, 2014. "Simulation des impacts de la politique d’autosuffisance en riz de l’Afrique de l’ouest," Conference papers 332560, Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project.
    2. Charl Jooste & Marina Marinkov, 2012. "South Africa'S Transition To A Consolidated Budget," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 80(2), pages 181-199, June.
    3. Kugbee S. James & Insah Baba, 2015. "Fiscal Sustainability in the Ghanaian Economy: A Fiscal Reaction Function Approach," Economy, Asian Online Journal Publishing Group, vol. 2(1), pages 16-20.

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