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Macroprudential Policies and Financial Stability

Author

Listed:
  • ANDREW HUGHES HALLETT
  • JAN LIBICH
  • PETR STEHLÍK

Abstract

The paper attempts to assess to what extent the central bank or the government should respond to developments that can cause financial instability, such as housing or asset bubbles, overextended budgetary policies, or excessive public and household debt. To analyse this question we set up a simple reduced-form model in which monetary and fiscal policy interact, and imbalances (bubbles) can occur in the medium-run. Considering several scenarios with both benevolent and idiosyncratic policy-makers, the analysis shows that the answer depends on a number of characteristics of the economy, as well as on the monetary and fiscal policy preferences with respect to inflation and output stabilization. We show that socially optimal financial instability prevention should be carried out by: (i) both monetary and fiscal policy (sharing region) under some circumstances, and (ii) fiscal policy only (specialization region) under others. There is however a moral hazard problem: both policy-makers have an incentive to be insufficiently pro-active in safeguarding financial stability, and shift the responsibility to the other policy. Specifically, under a range of circumstances we obtain a situation in which neither policy mitigates instability threats (indifference region). These results can be related to the build-up of the current global financial crisis, and have strong implications for the optimal design of the delegation process.
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Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Hughes Hallett & Jan Libich & Petr Stehlík, 2011. "Macroprudential Policies and Financial Stability," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 87(277), pages 318-334, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:87:y:2011:i:277:p:318-334
    DOI: j.1475-4932.2010.00692.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Muhammad Ali Nasir & Junjie Wu & Milton Yago & Alaa M. Soliman, 2016. "Macroeconomic policy interaction: State dependency and implications for financial stability in UK: A systemic review," Cogent Business & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(1), pages 1154283-115, December.
    2. Christos Mavrodimitrakis, 2022. "Debt stabilization and financial stability in a monetary union: Market versus authority‐based preventive solutions," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(2), pages 2582-2599, April.
    3. Andrew Hughes Hallett & John Lewis, 2015. "Monetary policy and sovereign debt: Does the ECB take the eurozone’s fiscal risks into account?," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 42(3), pages 499-520, August.
    4. Muhammad Ali Nasir & Milton Yago & Alaa M. Soliman & Junjie Wu, 2016. "Financial stability, wealth effects and optimal macroeconomic policy combination in the United Kingdom: A new-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework," Cogent Economics & Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(1), pages 1136098-113, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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