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Financial Instability Prevention

  • Andrew Hughes Hallett

    ()

  • Jan Libich

    ()

  • Petr Stehlik

    ()

The paper attempts to assess to what extent the central bank or the government should respond to developments that cause ?financial instability, such as housing or asset bubbles, overextended fi?scal policies, or excessive public or household debt. To analyze this question we set up a simple reduced-form model in which mone- tary and fi?scal policy interact, and consider several scenarios with both benevolent and idiosyncratic policymakers. The analysis shows that the answer depends on certain characteristics of the economy, as well as on the degree of ambition and con- servatism of the two policymakers. Speci?fically, we identify circumstances under which fi?nancial instability prevention is best carried out by: (i) both monetary and ?fiscal policy ("sharing"), (ii) only one of the policies ("specialization"), and (iii) nei- ther policy ("indifference"). In the former two cases there are circumstances under which either policy should be more pro-active than the other, and also circum- stances under which fi?scal policy should be ultra-active: ie care about nothing but the prevention of ?financial instability. These results are important in the context of the current crisis. We also show that neither the government nor the central bank should be allowed to freely select the degree of their activism in regard to fi?nancial instability threats. This is because of a moral hazard problem: both policymakers have an incentive to be insufficiently pro-active, and shift the responsibility to the other policy. Such behaviour has strong implications for the optimal design of the delegation process.

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File URL: http://cbe.anu.edu.au/research/papers/camawpapers/Papers/2009/Hallett_Libich_Stehlik_142009.pdf
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Paper provided by Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University in its series CAMA Working Papers with number 2009-14.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:een:camaaa:2009-14
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  1. P. Siklos & M. Bohl, 2006. "Asset Prices as Indicators of Euro Area Monetary Policy: An Empirical Assessment of Their Role in a Taylor Rule," Working Papers eg0053, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics, revised 2006.
  2. Vickers, John, 2000. "Monetary Policy and Asset Prices," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 68(0), pages 1-22, Supplemen.
  3. Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 2001. "Should Central Banks Respond to Movements in Asset Prices?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 253-257, May.
  4. Olivier Jeanne & Michael D. Bordo, 2002. "Monetary Policy and Asset Prices; Does "Benign Neglect" Make Sense?," IMF Working Papers 02/225, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Jan Libich & Andrew Hughes Hallett & Petr Stehlik, 2007. "Monetary And Fiscal Policy Interaction With Various Degrees And Types Of Commitment," CAMA Working Papers 2007-21, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
  6. Faia, Ester & Monacelli, Tommaso, 2007. "Optimal interest rate rules, asset prices, and credit frictions," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(10), pages 3228-3254, October.
  7. Gilchrist, Simon & Leahy, John V., 2002. "Monetary policy and asset prices," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 75-97, January.
  8. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2001. "The Transmission Mechanism and the Role of Asset Prices in Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 8617, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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