Independent Monetary Policies and Social Equality
The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and fiscal policy are implemented in the second stage. When fiscal policy has a social equality component, there is a natural conflict between optimally configured monetary policies and equality. As a result, governments interested in social redistribution, when faced with an independent central bank, will have an incentive to limit their use of fiscal policy.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/wparchive/index.html|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
- Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2005.
"Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design,"
German Economic Review,
Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 6(1), pages 1-21, 02.
- Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2002. "Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics, and Central Bank Design," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0202, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Weymark, Diana, 2002. "Independence before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3336, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
- Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994.
"How independent should a central bank be?,"
Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory
94-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
- Avinash Dixit & Luisa Lambertini, 2003.
"Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1522-1542, December.
- Avinash Dixit & Luisa Lambertini, 2003. "Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 575, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Rules and Discretion with Noncoordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(4), pages 619-30, October.
- Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0307. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.