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الإطار النظرى للتنسيق بين السياستين المالية والنقدية
[The Theoretical Framework for the Coordination of Fiscal and Monetary Polices]

  • Kamal, Mona

This study aims to bring into view the importance of the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies through reviewing the theoretical framework for such coordination. This includes: the interaction between the two policies, the evolution of this issue in the economic literature, the determinants of the coordination, the institutional coordinating arrangements and the operating mechanisms for the effectiveness of this coordination.

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File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26856/1/MPRA_paper_26856.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 26856.

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Date of creation: Nov 2010
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:26856
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  1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
  2. Broz, J. Lawrence, 1998. "The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(02), pages 231-268, March.
  3. Claudia Helene Dziobek & John W. Dalton, 2005. "Central Bank Losses and Experiences in Selected Countries," IMF Working Papers 05/72, International Monetary Fund.
  4. von Thadden, Leopold, 2003. "Active monetary policy, passive fiscal policy and the value of public debt: some further monetarist arithmetic," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2003,12, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  5. Avinash Dixit & Luisa Lambertini, 2003. "Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 575, Boston College Department of Economics.
  6. Bilin Neyapti, 2003. "Budget Deficits and Inflation: The Roles of Central Bank Independence and Financial Market Development," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 21(4), pages 458-475, October.
  7. Michael Woodford, 1995. "Price Level Determinacy Without Control of a Monetary Aggregate," NBER Working Papers 5204, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Mark M. Spiegel, 1998. "Central bank independence and inflation expectations: evidence from British index-linked gilts," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, pages 3-14.
  9. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2004. "Can Inflation Targeting Work in Emerging Market Countries?," NBER Working Papers 10646, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Bofinger, Peter, 2001. "Monetary Policy: Goals, Institutions, Strategies, and Instruments," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199248568, May.
  11. Henderson, R. & Jaffe, A.B.: Tratenberg, M., 1995. "Universities as a Source of Commercial Technology: A Detailed Analysis of University Patenting 1965-1988," Papers 09-95, Tel Aviv.
  12. Currie, Elizabeth & Dethier, Jean-Jacques & Togo, Eriko, 2003. "Institutional arrangements for public debt management," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3021, The World Bank.
  13. Momi Dahan, 1998. "The Fiscal Effects of Monetary Policy," IMF Working Papers 98/66, International Monetary Fund.
  14. Stefano Eusepi & Jess Benhabib, 2005. "The Design of Monetary and Fiscal Policy: A Global Perspective," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 388, Society for Computational Economics.
  15. Miguel A. Savastano & Paul R. Masson & Sunil Sharma, 1997. "The Scope for Inflation Targeting in Developing Countries," IMF Working Papers 97/130, International Monetary Fund.
  16. Reinhart, Carmen & Calvo, Guillermo, 2002. "Fear of floating," MPRA Paper 14000, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Lawrence J. Christiano & Terry J. Fitzgerald, 2000. "Understanding the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level," NBER Working Papers 7668, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Weymark, Diana N., 2004. "Independent monetary policies and social equity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 103-110, October.
  19. Garry J. Schinasi, 2003. "Responsibility of Central Banks for Stability in Financial Markets," IMF Working Papers 03/121, International Monetary Fund.
  20. Alberto Musalem Borrero, 2001. "On the Long and Short of Central Bank Independence, Policy Coordination, and Economic Performance," IMF Working Papers 01/19, International Monetary Fund.
  21. Goyal, Ashima, 2002. "Coordinating monetary and fiscal policies: a role for rules?," MPRA Paper 29200, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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