Inflation, Income Redistribution, and Optimal Central Bank Independence
The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage non-cooperative game between the government and the central bank. The solution to this policy game determines the optimal combination of central bank conservatism and independence. The results obtained show that the optimal combination of central bank conservatism and independence that minimizes government losses is not unique and that there is substitutability between these institutional characteristics. Consequently, partial central bank independence can be optimal. The framework I employ provides a theoretical basis for interpreting the results obtained in empirical studies of the relationship between inflation and central bank independence.
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