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Anmerkungen zur Koordinierung der makroökonomischen Politik in der WWU

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  • Otmar Issing

Abstract

In diesem Beitrag wird argumentiert, dass die Regierungen der Mitgliedstaaten der WWU und die autonomen Sozialpartner bei der Konzeption und Durchführung der Politik, für die sie jweils verantwortlich sind, den übergeordneten Stabilitätsrahmen berücksichtigen sollten, den der Maastrichter Vertrag sowie der Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt vorgeben. Handeln sie nach diesem Prinzip, dann werden eine tragfähige und angemessene Finanzpolitik sowie moderate Lohnabschlüsse, die der Wechselwirkung zwischen der Entwicklung der Lohnkosten und der stabilitätsorientierten einheitlichen Geldpolitik Rechnung tragen, einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Schaffung günstiger Bedingungen für Wirtschaftswachstum und Beschäftigung leisten. Wenn die Regierungen und Sozialpartner bei Entscheidungen über ihr eigenes Handeln die glaubwürdige Verpflichtung der einheitlichen Geldpolitik zur Wahrung der Preisstabilität als gegeben voraussetzen, wird dies ex post zu implizit koordinierten Entscheidungen führen und gleichzeitig Politikkonflikte und die Unsicherheit über den wirtschaftspolitischen Handlungsrahmen begrenzen. Eine explizite Koordinierung würde hingegen die Zuständigkeiten der individuellen Entschdiungsträger unscharf werden lassen, die Transparenz des wirtschaftspolitischen Handlungsrahmens verringern und es erschweren, die individuellen Entscheidungsträger in die Verantwortung zu nehmen.

Suggested Citation

  • Otmar Issing, 2002. "Anmerkungen zur Koordinierung der makroökonomischen Politik in der WWU," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 71(3), pages 312-324.
    • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:71-30-3
    DOI: 10.3790/vjh.71.3.312
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    1. Pusch, Toralf, 2007. "Verteilungskampf und geldpolitische Sanktion," Working Papers on Economic Governance 23, University of Hamburg, Department of Socioeconomics.
    2. Heinz-Peter Spahn, 2004. "Stabilität und Staatsschulden: die europäische Wirtschaftspolitik in der strategischen Sackgasse," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(3), pages 429-444.

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