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Does International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination Pay and Is It Sustainable?: A Two Country Analysis

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  • Levine, Paul
  • Currie, David

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  • Levine, Paul & Currie, David, 1987. "Does International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination Pay and Is It Sustainable?: A Two Country Analysis," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(1), pages 38-74, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:39:y:1987:i:1:p:38-74
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    Cited by:

    1. McNelis, Paul D. & Asilis, Carlos M., 2002. "Macroeconomic policy games and asset-price volatility in the EMS: a linear quadratic control analysis of France, Germany, Italy and Spain," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 1-24, January.
    2. Thomas Krichel & Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman, 1996. "Fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union: Credible inflation targets or monetized debt?," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 132(1), pages 28-54, March.
    3. McNelis, Paul D. & Asilis, Carlos M., 1995. "Monetary policy games with broad money targets a linear quadratic control analysis of the U.S. and Japan," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(5-7), pages 1091-1111.
    4. Fischer, Stanley, 2017. "Committee Decisions and Monetary Policy Rules : a speech at "The Structural Foundations of Monetary Policy," a Hoover Institution Monetary Policy Conference, Stanford University, Stanford, C," Speech 951, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    5. Miller, Marcus & Salmon, Mark, 1990. "When does coordination pay?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 14(3-4), pages 553-569, October.
    6. Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman, 2002. "Delegation and Fiscal Policy in the Open Economy: More Bad News for Rogoff's Delegation Game," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 153-174, April.
    7. Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman & Richard Pierse, 2007. "Monetary Policy Coordination Revisited in a Two-Bloc DSGE Model," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0907, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    8. Peter Mooslechner & Martin Schuerz, 1999. "International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination: Any Lessons for EMU? A Selective Survey of the Literature," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 26(3), pages 171-199, September.
    9. Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman & Bo Yang, 2008. "The Credibility Problem Revisited: Thirty Years on from Kydland and Prescott," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(4), pages 728-746, September.

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