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The Credibility Problem Revisited: Thirty Years on from Kydland and Prescott

  • Paul Levine
  • Joseph Pearlman
  • Bo Yang

Macroeconomics research has changed profoundly since the Kydland-Prescott seminal paper. In order to address the Lucas Critique, modeling is now based on micro-foundations treating agents as rational utility optimizers. Bayesian estimation has produced models which are more data-consistent than those based simply on calibration. With micro-foundations and new linear-quadratic techniques, normative policy based on welfare analysis is now possible. In the open economy, policy involves a "game" with policymakers and private institutions or private individuals as players. This paper attempts to reassess the Kydland-Prescott contribution in the light of these developments. Copyright � 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation � 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of International Economics.

Volume (Year): 16 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (09)
Pages: 728-746

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Handle: RePEc:bla:reviec:v:16:y:2008:i:4:p:728-746
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