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Monetary Policy Coordination Revisited in a Two-Bloc DSGE Model

Author

Listed:
  • Paul Levine

    (University of Surrey)

  • Joseph Pearlman

    (London Metropolitan University)

  • Richard Pierse

    (University of Surrey)

Abstract

We reassess the gains from monetary policy coordination within the confines of the canonical NOEM in the light of three issues. First, the literature uses a number of cooperative and non-cooperative equilibrium concepts that do not always clearly distinguish commitment and discretionary outcomes, and in some cases adopts inappropriate concepts. Second, our analysis is welfare based. Moreover, as with much of this literature, we adopt a linear-quadratic approximation of the actual non-linear non-quadratic stochastic optimization problem facing the monetary policymakers. Our second objective then is to re-assess welfare gains using an accurate approximation for such a problem, a feature that for the most part is lacking in previous studies. Finally, we examine the issue where the monetary authority is restricted to rules that are operational in two senses: first, the zero lower bound constraint is imposed on the optimal rule and second, we study simple Taylor-type commitment rules that unlike fully optimal rules are easily monitored by the public.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman & Richard Pierse, 2007. "Monetary Policy Coordination Revisited in a Two-Bloc DSGE Model," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0907, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
  • Handle: RePEc:sur:surrec:0907
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    File URL: https://repec.som.surrey.ac.uk/2007/DP09-07.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 1996. "Foundations of International Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262150476, January.
    2. Alan Sutherland, 2002. "International monetary policy coordination and financial market integration," International Finance Discussion Papers 751, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Currie,David & Levine,Paul, 2009. "Rules, Reputation and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521104609, May.
    4. Obstfeld, Maurice & Rogoff, Kenneth, 2000. "New directions for stochastic open economy models," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 117-153, February.
    5. Clarida, Richard & Gali, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 2002. "A simple framework for international monetary policy analysis," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 879-904, July.
    6. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2003. "What Is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 426-477, June.
    7. Lane, Philip R., 2001. "The new open economy macroeconomics: a survey," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 235-266, August.
    8. Pappa, Evi, 2004. "Do the ECB and the fed really need to cooperate? Optimal monetary policy in a two-country world," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 753-779, May.
    9. Hamada, Koichi, 1976. "A Strategic Analysis of Monetary Interdependence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(4), pages 677-700, August.
    10. Levine, Paul & McAdam, Peter & Pearlman, Joseph, 2008. "Quantifying and sustaining welfare gains from monetary commitment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(7), pages 1253-1276, October.
    11. Günter Coenen & Giovanni Lombardo & Frank Smets & Roland Straub, 2007. "International Transmission and Monetary Policy Cooperation," NBER Chapters,in: International Dimensions of Monetary Policy, pages 157-192 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman & Richard Pierse, 2006. "Linear-Quadratic Approximation, Efficiency and Target-Implementability," Computing in Economics and Finance 2006 441, Society for Computational Economics.
    13. repec:hrv:faseco:34721962 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Canzoneri, Matthew B. & Cumby, Robert E. & Diba, Behzad T., 2005. "The need for international policy coordination: what's old, what's new, what's yet to come?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 363-384, July.
    15. Levine, Paul & Currie, David, 1987. "Does International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination Pay and Is It Sustainable?: A Two Country Analysis," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(1), pages 38-74, March.
    16. Choudhary, M. Ali & Levine, Paul, 2006. "Idle worship," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 77-83, January.
    17. Currie, David & Levine, Paul & Pearlman, Joseph, 1996. "The Choice of 'Conservative' Bankers in Open Economies: Monetary Regime Options for Europe," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(435), pages 345-358, March.
    18. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth Rogoff, 2002. "Global Implications of Self-Oriented National Monetary Rules," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(2), pages 503-535.
    19. Coenen, Günter & McAdam, Peter & Straub, Roland, 2008. "Tax reform and labour-market performance in the euro area: A simulation-based analysis using the New Area-Wide Model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(8), pages 2543-2583, August.
    20. Levine, Paul & Currie, David, 1987. "The design of feedback rules in linear stochastic rational expectations models," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 1-28, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Levine, Paul & Pearlman, Joseph & Pierse, Richard, 2008. "Linear-quadratic approximation, external habit and targeting rules," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(10), pages 3315-3349, October.
    2. Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman & Peter Welz, 2008. "Robust Inflation-Targeting Rules and the Gains from International Policy Coordination," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0208, School of Economics, University of Surrey.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    monetary rules; open economy; coordination games; commitment; discretion; zero bound constraint;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E37 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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