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The Credibility Problem Revisited: Thirty Years on from Kydland and Prescott

Author

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  • Paul Levine

    (University of Surrey)

  • Joseph Pearlman

    (London Metropolitan University)

  • Bo Yang

    (University of Surrey)

Abstract

Macroeconomics research has changed profoundly since the Kydland-Prescott seminal paper. In order to address the Lucas Critique, modelling now is based on microfoundations treating agents as rational utility optimizers. Bayesian estimation has produced models which are more data consistent than those based simply on calibration. With micro-foundations and new linear-quadratic techniques, normative policy based on welfare analysis is now possible. In the open economy, policy involves a ‘game’ with policymakers and private institutions or private individuals as players. This paper attempts to reassess the Kydland-Prescott contribution in the light of these developments.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman & Bo Yang, 2007. "The Credibility Problem Revisited: Thirty Years on from Kydland and Prescott," School of Economics Discussion Papers 1807, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
  • Handle: RePEc:sur:surrec:1807
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Adolfson, Malin & Laséen, Stefan & Lindé, Jesper & Svensson, Lars E.O., 2014. "Monetary policy trade-offs in an estimated open-economy DSGE model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 33-49.
    2. Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman & Bo Yang, 2008. "The Credibility Problem Revisited: Thirty Years on from Kydland and Prescott," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(4), pages 728-746, September.
    3. Paul Middleditch, 2010. "A New Keynesian Model with Heterogeneous Price Setting," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 150, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary rules; commitment; discretion; open economy; coordination gains.;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E37 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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