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Developments in the Political Economy of Policy Coordination

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  • Thomas Willett

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Abstract

Issues of macroeconomic and exchange rate policy coordination have cycled in and out of the forefront of international policy discussions a number of times over the last several decades, yet little systematic progress has been made in institutionalizing this process and both the potential benefits and costs of cordination strategies remain highly controversial. This essay reviews the recent technical and political economy literature on this subject, highlighting the major areas of consesus and disagreement. It emphasizes the importance of taking uncertainty and political economy considerations into account. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Willett, 1999. "Developments in the Political Economy of Policy Coordination," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 221-253, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:10:y:1999:i:2:p:221-253
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1008373406841
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    33. Michael W. Klein & Eric S. Rosengren, 1991. "Foreign exchange intervention as a signal of monetary policy," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue May, pages 39-50.
    34. Michael D. Bordo & Anna J. Schwartz, 1990. "What has Foreign Market Intervention Since the Plaza Agreement Accomplished?," NBER Working Papers 3562, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    35. Hughes Hallett, A J, 1993. "Exchange Rates and Asymmetric Policy Regimes: When Does Exchange Rate Targeting Pay?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 45(2), pages 191-206, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Anton Korinek, 2016. "Currency Wars or Efficient Spillovers? A General Theory of International Policy Cooperation," NBER Working Papers 23004, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Anton Korinek, 2017. "Currency wars or efficient spillovers?," BIS Working Papers 615, Bank for International Settlements.
    3. Rudiger Arnim & Daniele Tavani & Laura Carvalho, 2014. "Redistribution in a Neo-Kaleckian Two-country Model," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(3), pages 430-459, July.
    4. Iljoong Kim & Inbae Kim, 2005. "Endogenous changes in the exchange rate regime: A bureaucratic incentive model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 339-361, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    macroeconomic policy E6; F4; exchange rate policy F3; F4; international monetary relations F3;

    JEL classification:

    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • F4 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • F4 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance

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