IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/190.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

International Policy Cooperation and Model Uncertainty

Author

Listed:
  • Holtham, Gerald
  • Hughes Hallett, Andrew

Abstract

The main obstacles to coordinating policies in practice are uncertainty about the correct model to use for policy design, and uncertainty about external variables. This paper examines the former problem. Numerical calculations using ten models from the recent Brookings Multicountry comparison exercise showed both policies and the gains to coordination are quite sensitive to model variations - and hence to model errors. A framework is therefore set up in which policy-makers are able to choose their model and their policies jointly in order to try and protect the gains from coordination from potential model misspecifications and/or disagreements over which model is most appropriate. That produces an alternative policy bargaining system and better results in terms of the success of coordination.

Suggested Citation

  • Holtham, Gerald & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 1987. "International Policy Cooperation and Model Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers 190, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:190
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=190
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Barry Eichengreen and Fabio Ghironi., 1997. "European Monetary Unification and International Monetary Cooperation," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C97-091, University of California at Berkeley.
    2. Frankel, Jeffrey A., 1988. "Obstacles to International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(3-4), pages 353-374, July.
    3. Hallett, A. J. Hughes, 1995. "Policy bargains and the problem of model selection," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(5-7), pages 941-959.
    4. Mr. Roel M. W. J. Beetsma & Mr. Xavier Debrun & Mr. Franc Klaassen, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," IMF Working Papers 2001/178, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Yiyong Cai & Warwick McKibbin, 2015. "Uncertainty and International Climate Change Negotiations," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 1(1), pages 101-115, March.
    6. Patrick Artus, 1992. "Passage à l'union économique et monétaire en Europe : effets sur la croissance et les politiques budgétaires," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 106(5), pages 123-137.
    7. Thomas Willett, 1999. "Developments in the Political Economy of Policy Coordination," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 221-253, May.
    8. Jeffrey Frankel & Scott Erwin & Katharine Rockett, 1991. "A Note on Internationally Coordinated Policy Packages Intended to be Robust Under Model Uncertainty," NBER Working Papers 3747, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. A.J. Hallet, 1998. "When Do Target Zones Work? An Examination of Exchange Rate Targeting as a Device for Coordinating Economic Policies," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 115-138, April.
    10. Carlo Carraro, 1997. "Modelling International Policy Games: Lessons from European Monetary Coordination," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 24(3), pages 163-177, October.
    11. Jeffrey A. Frankel, 1990. "Obstacles to Coordination, and a Consideration of Two Proposals to Overcome Them: International Nominal Targeting (INT) and the Hosomi Fund," NBER Chapters, in: International Policy Coordination and Exchange Rate Fluctuations, pages 109-158, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Matthew B. Canzoneri & Hali J. Edison, 1990. "A new interpretation of the coordination problem and its empirical significance," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 399-435.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:190. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.